The intellectual Defence Agency’s core task is to build intellectual defence in Sweden. “To make certain the population is resilient, as well as organizations, civilian society and the private sector erstwhile dealing with abroad influence”, said the head of the operational department of the intellectual Defence Agency Mikael Tofvesson. In conversation, we raised issues concerning the function of the intellectual Defence Agency in Sweden’s safety apparatus, the Swedish contribution to NATO defence against disinformation, and abroad malign information influence operations against Sweden.
ANDRZEJ KOZŁOWSKI: What is the intellectual Defence Agency?
MIKAEL TOFVESSON: The intellectual Defence Agency (PDA) is simply a government agency under the defence ministry, where we besides have a minister for civilian defence. about 60 people working at this agency are divided into 3 departments: the administrative department, the capability building department and the operational department. The PDA was established in January 2022 but Sweden has a 70-year past of intellectual defence, which is simply a word that was created at the beginning of the Cold War. It has the capability to combat intellectual warfare and it is the reason why the agency exists. Sweden had specified an institution during the Cold War but erstwhile the conflict ended in the 1990s, we started to dismantle it. However, after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, we started the process of re-establishing it.
The agency’s core task is to build intellectual defence in Sweden. To make certain the population is resilient, as well as organizations, civilian society and the private sector erstwhile dealing with abroad influence. Another part of our work is identifying and countering the malign influence of abroad information that is targeting us. We work in 2 different processes: building resilience and handling threats. We besides prepare Sweden for war and intellectual warfare. If Sweden is at war or at hazard of being at war, we have a mandate to support the government with advice and the capabilities to counter any aggressor’s intent to attack Sweden. So, we besides have an offensive mandate if Sweden is at hazard of being attacked.
You utilized the word intellectual warfare. What is it and how does it look in practice?
Psychological warfare is an old word that was popular in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. It is utilized nowadays too. However, the more applicable word present is “Foreign Malign Information Influence”. This happens erstwhile you usage information as a tool to influence another actors in a malign way. The agency has the mandate to identify, analyse and counter abroad malign information influence. It must come from abroad and have clear bad intent. It must be malign, antagonistic and effort to harm us. It should be deceptive too. It does not substance if it is correct or incorrect but it must be deceptive. For instance, if you control the information environment you are certain that people only hear your side of the story. Even though what you are saying is correct it will not give a balanced account of what is truly going on.
How does abroad malign information influence look in the case of Sweden?
If you look at Swedish society there is simply quite a few information coming from abroad which is antagonistic and deceptive. We cannot defend against everything. To make this applicable to us, this information besides has to have a major negative impact. For instance, if you spread disinformation or rumours targeting Sweden that have a negative effect on the safety of our population, the functioning of our society or our fundamental values, or if they have a negative impact on freedom of speech, the democratic process or the regulation of law. Then it is unacceptable and the agency classifies it as abroad malign information influence and will take actions to counter it. This happens on a regular basis. For example, Russia invaded Crimea in 2014 and they focused their full influence capabilities on that conflict by trying to control the Ukrainian population, their own population, and any consequence from the remainder of the world. These were the main aims of the Russian operations. In that time, they did not have time to intervene in another countries. In 2014 and 2015, we were looking at the Russian influence apparatus and how they were shaping perceptions of the conflict and the invasion of Crimea as an action against Nazis in Ukraine. Their operations did make their way to many people who were not comfortable with cooperation with Kyiv.
At the beginning of 2015, we abruptly saw in Sweden how outlets like RT and Russian troll factories were operating regarding narratives surrounding Crimea and Ukraine. alternatively of dismantling this infrastructure, they targeted the remainder of Europe, especially Germany and the United Kingdom and even the United States. Also, Sweden was targeted. abruptly we saw that Russian outlets started to spread rumours about migration in Sweden, connecting it to terrorism, social unrest and criminality. It is simply a communicative that they have been building for many years. Migration is an issue in Sweden but it is an issue for many countries. The main subject of disinformation was that you cannot trust the government, you cannot trust the information environment. Therefore, it is better that you perceive to “us” – alternate media that can make distrust between the population and the country’s leadership. These activities are done to prepare a country for a intellectual operation. It is something they did in Ukraine before the invasion in 2014. It is something that they can do in Poland too. In the case of Ukraine it was part of preparations before the invasion. So I utilized to say that the Russians were filling up their car in preparation for an attack straight on Sweden. It is how they prepared the ground and besides it is how they prepared our ground, creating conflicts and distrust within our societies. Now erstwhile looking at Ukraine and intellectual warfare, it is clear that there are so many cases. They were spreading rumours constantly since 2015 and targeting Sweden right up to the full-scale invasion in 2022, which caused the EU to block Russian media outlets. So, they do not have an chance to scope our countries now.
This is what we reported to the government even before the agency was created. I worked in another agency that started these efforts. I have been working with these issues since 2021 and have been informing our government that the Russians are preparing for a future full-scale conflict with Sweden by influencing our population.
How do you qualify operations as abroad malign information influence operations? What kind of methodology do you use?
To answer this question I return to 2014, erstwhile Russia invaded Crimea and then the east part of Ukraine. In Sweden I had a squad of analysts, who looked at the Russian influence infrastructure, as well as the narratives and disinformation utilized and what channels were spreading it. We were looking for the way in which they coordinated their efforts, how the full infrastructure of Russian society was spreading these influential narratives about the invasion of Crimea. Therefore, we could gain detailed cognition on the Russian influence apparatus.
Since 2014 we have been able to monitor these ideas in item due to the fact that if they want to influence our society then they request to scope out. We subsequently observe their actions. Since we saw them in 2014 and followed them up, we noted their associated companies and structures and how they are integrated. We look and effort to realize what disinformation is being spread and how it is spreading in our society. However, we are besides focused on how the Russians are doing the same to their own population. Therefore, we can differentiate between interior disinformation that is spread in all countries and what the Russians are doing.
When we look at the disinformation, we mostly monitor rumours and misunderstandings which might make fear and besides topics concerning possible conflicts in our society. So, we make a list of topics that might be exploited by the Russians. Almost all gathering in the agency starts with going through the topics, due to the fact that we have classified them as vulnerabilities. erstwhile we make specified a registry we never note who is behind the ideas due to the fact that we want Swedish citizens to usage their freedom of speech. If you have freedom of speech it besides gives you the right to be wrong. So we cannot treat our population as the threat. They have a right to be incorrect and spread disinformation, in another words. But this situation could be exploited. For example, there could be heightened fears of atomic weapons, or the negative impact of joining NATO, or even fear of an energy crisis.
For instance, we receive information about the actions of threat actors concerning Sweden, as well as what narratives are being utilized by the Russians targeting Sweden. Then we can connect them with our list of vulnerabilities. For example, the Russian influence apparatus is focusing on the energy sector during winter erstwhile the prices of heating are rising. If it is an issue and they are utilizing it against the Swedish population then it is time to analyse the threat and realize what it can mean for us. What kind of negative effects could there be if people start to believe Russian narratives? Who plays the main roles in spreading this disinformation? Then we start the process of what we can do about it. This is simply a description of our standard procedure of operation.
It is crucial to stress that the agency counters only abroad disinformation and this is done strictly for democratic reasons. As a defence organization, our operations could not be utilized against our own population. People who spread disinformation in our societies are perceived as a vulnerability and not as a threat. A vulnerability is individual who needs aid and support to make them resilient against the threat of abroad actors specified as Russia, which spread disinformation that we request to counter. The agency can exposure these disinformation narratives and usage any tool to counter them and strike back. Therefore, we have this perspective: interior disinformation is simply a vulnerability, while external disinformation is simply a threat.
You mentioned countering or even counter strikes, so what precisely are you doing to counter abroad malign information influence operations?
The agency has a proportional framework for countering disinformation and the best way to illustrate how it works is the following case. erstwhile the agency sees that individual is spreading disinformation which could be harmful to the safety and functioning of our population or fundamental values, the first thing we do erstwhile we see this is analyse how it is spread, follow it and then possibly control it. If we go for all small part of disinformation we would alternatively hazard amplifying its message.
Our next step is to look at who the affected audience is concerning this disinformation, who can be fooled by this and then make certain that they get the correct information. This can be done without even talking about disinformation. Just making certain that people are well informed so that they can analyse disinformation with the facts and thereby make resilience in society. If we actively item disinformation it can someway become interesting and then the disinformation gains better traction. The first regulation of countering disinformation or deception is to never talk about it. If this does not work and it inactive has traction then you request to go for active countermeasures. We will say that it is indeed disinformation, so don’t believe it and here you can find the facts instead. But if this approach does not work then we identify the channels spreading the disinformation and show how they are spreading it and offer facts. If this inactive does not work, then we will full face the actors that are spreading the disinformation and say that these groups are actively targeting Sweden. They are trying to harm Sweden so don’t believe the disinformation. Instead, find the facts.
We are a defence organization and our countermeasures are proportional to attacks and their aggressive behaviour. In war we can besides engage in cooperation with the armed forces to take down infrastructure that is being utilized by threat actors. Anything is on the table, just look at Ukraine and it is clear how people are willing to do anything to strike back. But those are only options for us at the minute and we are not going into details. This is due to the fact that it is for the Russians to figure out if they want to attack us. I gotta add that we are part of the government so it is not up to us to exposure another nation’s disinformation, unless the government gives us a mandate. The good thing for us is that most nations usage proxies for spreading disinformation. Since the proxies are not working for circumstantial nations, we can work against them due to the fact that they are not state entities. Then we can decide who we can expose.
Now I would like to talk about 1 incidental we experienced. It was not a proxy but an extremist political actor with capabilities comparable to a nation state erstwhile it comes to the information environment. This was at the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022, erstwhile there was an outlet called “Islamic Affairs”. They were spreading disinformation in the Arabic-speaking environment, accusing the Swedish government of kidnapping Muslim kids for sex trafficking, “de-Islamization” or placing them with LGBTQ+ families. People were truly upset. It spread rumours that the government were kidnapping these kids and they utilized footage from policy intervention as proof. The disinformation became viral, upsetting many people in Sweden. We saw that the disinformation was truly toxic and how threats started toward municipality workers who work with kid protection. There were besides threats against politicians. They were besides calling for violent acts and demonstrations in Sweden. Naturally, in Sweden you can show as much as you want but our agencies that defend against vulnerabilities here realize that demonstrations may affect people who are fooled by specified disinformation.
The problem is that they were working in an Arabic-speaking environment and we did not have any available information about the factual process with the children. We could not go immediately and spread correct information. It was so toxic and could have threatened the safety and safety of our population, so we decided to strike back against “Islamic Affairs”. We classified it as a foreign, antagonistic and deceptive body that was undermining trust and our basic values, so we decided to engage with Swedish public media to exposure the group’s support for extremism and undemocratic values. They were consistently spreading disinformation about Sweden and another countries in order to radicalize Arabic-speaking people in order to make a conflict between them and the West, and Sweden was a tool.
This was an example of striking back by telling people that they should not perceive to specified channels. Of course, there was a long process of uncovering out about the group. This channel besides attacks France and another countries. It was a tiny platform with very fewer people but it was very successful in creating conflict and hatred. So, then we countered them in the information environment.
What happens if abroad malign information actors usage proxies in Sweden? How are you dealing with this situation?
First of all, we request to make a connection to abroad activities. We never criticize anyone internally. At the same time, if we say that disinformation is being spread in our information environment by Swedish actors but see that it has originated from abroad then we inform our population that it is coming from abroad. So we say that the Russians are working in this area and that we shouldn’t be a pawn. In specified cases, the decision always belongs to the interior actors to decide about the measures. At the same time, disinformation could challenge the healthcare service, abroad policy, immigration, social unrest or criminality. But the agency only reacts erstwhile national and global disinformation become 1 clear problem, then all the agencies and authorities that are applicable meet. This involves communication coordination and then we will discuss how we can handle the situation. How do we make certain that people get the correct information? erstwhile should they get it? What is the best way to scope out to the groups that should be addressed? After specified a gathering all agency, authority and organization starts their planning and implements procedures.
Sometimes, the agency recommends that the government actively speaks out. If it is simply a nationwide problem then the government is best suited to deal with it. What we did with muslim Affairs was that the prime minister and I gave a press conference just to talk about this issue and send a message to everyone. The reason why disinformation works is that you are susceptible and 1 reason why you are susceptible is that you are not aware that it is simply a threat. individual is going to attack you with disinformation. The another part of vulnerability is that you don’t know your own vulnerabilities. So you don’t know what topics or issues you are susceptible to regarding disinformation. The 3rd vulnerability is that you don’t know what to do erstwhile you see disinformation. You don’t have a toolbox to handle it. The 4th vulnerability is that you are not coordinated and that you don’t aid another people, you don’t inform each another so if disinformation is being spread you are not helping your friends and so the disinformation can proliferate. What we can do to counter disinformation is increase the awareness of the threat and identify our vulnerabilities. We besides urge how to engage with this disinformation. For instance, do not share this kind of information or be aware that it could be disinformation, be careful before sharing it.
When you set up the agency, was there any criticism that, for example, you were creating an “Agency of Censorship”?
There has not been that much but naturally there were groups that spread this narrative. But I must say that erstwhile I worked with another agency in 2014 it was more controversial actually then. But due to the Russian full-scale invasion people are very motivated here in Sweden and we are very adamant about preparing for a abroad threat. It was not only the invasion of Ukraine but we besides had the incidents with muslim Affairs and the Quran burnings. Those happened in Sweden and there was quite a few disinformation spread by Iranian proxies and another extremist groups. I think there is simply a good knowing in Sweden that we are here to defend Swedes but there are always people hesitant or outspokenly negative about any government activities so, of course, there is simply a minority. Frankly speaking I was expecting more than we saw.
The intellectual Defence Agency is simply a uncommon case of a state institution that is actively fighting malign influence operations and disinformation. But in this fight global cooperation is crucial. How does the agency cooperate with institutions from another countries?
I can only give a general position due to the fact that as a defence organization we cannot share details about bilateral contacts. First of all, we are engaged with the European Union External Action Service, where they have the East Stratcom Task Force and the group for the Western Balkans, so many experts are working there. We have besides 1 expert at the NATO STRATCOM Centre of Excellence in Riga, and in Estonia we have an advisor on intellectual defence at the Swedish embassy. They are there to work with Estonia and another Baltic countries. Hopefully, we will be in NATO shortly and we will play a more concrete function then. The good message is that erstwhile Sweden joins NATO, the Alliance will have an experienced defence agency supporting this domain of intellectual defence.
The agency besides has close bilateral contacts with respective nations due to the fact that fighting disinformation is all about cooperation and coordination. For instance, if Russia wants to attack Sweden, 1 way of doing that will be to endanger Finland. The information environment is global. If you go for a consecutive threat against 1 country then only 1 population will get angry. Russians are good at threatening many countries. What Russia is besides trying to do is to make divisions between the EU and NATO and between associate states within these organizations. Therefore, they routinely spread disinformation about another countries to make a peculiar country upset. The agency has very close connections with global partners and knows if disinformation is being spread in another countries.
How do you cooperate with the media, NGOs and fact-checking organizations that are engaged in fighting disinformation?
They are highly crucial for us. We are mandated and instructed to support Swedish media. It works in the way that Swedish media might contact us if they request support in the area of our responsibility. We besides set up training for journalists on the topics of recognition and handling abroad malign influence operations. It is not our analysts who are doing the training but we are financing and supporting the Fojo Media Institute at Linnaeus University, where there is continuous training for journalists. So if you have a writer ID, you are eligible to take courses there.
They give circumstantial courses based on our knowledge. We besides invitation representatives of Swedish media twice a year to give them situation awareness reports and perceive to their feedback. The crucial thing is that this all goes in 1 direction, which means that we cannot ask journalists for anything. The agency has come up with a handbook for journalists and our media strategy discourages unnecessary contacts with journalists. It is beautiful clear that we request to realize the media’s function in countering disinformation and abroad state influence campaigns.
In strong democracies you have a leadership that is simply a mark of attackers due to the fact that it is the decision making process of the country that the attackers want to control. So if they make a bad decision for our country, an adversary might gain from this. If the leadership is making mistakes and bad decisions, they will lose their jobs following an election or investigations by journalists due to the fact that they are accountable to the people. The thing is that to be able to influence the leadership you request besides to influence the population, so you gotta mark these 2 levels with the same kind of long-term disinformation. You do that in the environment where the politicians, leaders and the population meet. This is in conventional and social media. This is simply a reason why the Russians are very active in our own media outlets and on social media. In this way they can make a fresh collective conscience about the situation and slow shift values and norms to prepare for a coming attack. As a result, in the agency we have analysts working with conventional and social media to make certain that we realize that environment.
You mentioned Iranian proxies spreading disinformation about Quran burning at a point during NATO accession. Did you find that these Iranian proxies cooperated with Russia?
The Iranians were motivated to intervene due to the fact that they are targeting Sweden for another reason. There is an Iranian citizen who committed crimes against humanity and was subsequently arrested and convicted in Sweden. Since then, Iran has been targeting Sweden with its influence campaigns. Of course, it was a good chance for them to mark Sweden’s NATO application and to harm the country more generally. So they have their own incentives to do this. We besides saw that the Russians were meddling in this and we warned the population about Iran and Russia being active in this wider campaign. But I stressed that in the case of the Quran burning the main actors were “Islamic Affairs”, Daesh and Al Qaeda. all extremist jumped in on it. There might be any coordination but in general they all have their own interests here. The intent of these actions was clearly to antagonize Turkey and halt Swedish accession to NATO.
How might the intellectual Defence Agency support NATO erstwhile Sweden joins the Alliance?
It is an issue we are presently debating and we are having a dialog with respective institutions. We have already established cooperation with NATO STRATCOM. We have been supporting NATO efforts since 2015 and I do believe that we will strengthen the Alliance with our expertise on Russia and another nations’ influence infrastructure. We can be more collaborative within these areas concerning threat actors but besides in the integration of countermeasures.
Last but not least, we have extended cooperation with Ukraine. Many another nations are doing this besides but we are actually doing it from the intellectual defence perspective, so we have an chance to test out our ideas and solutions. At the same time, we are helping the Ukrainians with activities there. I think that is something we want to bring to the table.
This interview was originally published in Polish by Nowa Europa Wschodnia.
Mikael Tofvesson is head of the operations department at the Swedish intellectual Defence Agency. He was previously head of the Counter Information Influence Section at the Swedish civilian Contingencies Agency (MSB).
Andrzej Kozłowski is simply a cybersecurity and disinformation expert and assistant prof. at the University of Lodz. He holds a PhD in political discipline and is the erstwhile editor-in-chief of the CyberDefence24.pl portal. He conducts lectures, training and seminars on cybersecurity and the fight against disinformation.
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