About 40% of Czechs want Ukraine to win the war, while about 10% express explicit support for Russia and the remaining 50% are ambivalent, which influences the political dynamics and consequently the information landscape, Ivan Ruta Cuker of CEDMO told EURACTIV.pl.
Disinformation in Czechia in brief
Dominating narratives: related to the war in Ukraine, COVID-19, current affairs (e.g. the Olympic Games), NATO, the United States, Czech home politics, anti-Western agenda
Main disinformation spreaders: Russia, home actors
Most popular fake stories: boxer Imane Khelif being a male, the Czech Republic is little economically developed than Bangladesh, the EU’s links to environmentalists, EU regulations mandating adding insects to flour, Czech PM’s promise regarding salaries
What is being done to combat disinformation: improving general media literacy, teaching critical reasoning to young people
Welcome to TruthTalks, a brave fresh podcast series tackling the challenges resulting from fake news and propaganda head-on. Join us for engaging short conversations with experts from all EU associate states and Ukraine as we uncover the fact behind dominant disinformation trends and research the strategies shaping Europe’s fight against manipulation.
In this episode we are zooming in on the Czech Republic in our interview with Ivan Ruta Cuker, a data analyst at CEDMO (Central European Digital Media Observatory).
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: What are the dominant narratives and topics that are most frequently targeted by disinformation in the Czech Republic?
Ivan Ruta Cuker: It’s a very broad question due to the fact that there are 2 ways to look at it. 1 is focusing on the disinformative narratives we’ve identified in public debate. The another is answering the question, “what disinformative narratives have you encountered?”, which we paper all period in our questionnaire.
When it comes to the disinformation we deal with, it has lately been mostly focused on issues regarding the invasion of Ukraine. These matters are frequently highlighted but tend to be comparatively temporary. A akin example would be the COVID-19 pandemic, which was previously the main focus of disinformation but is no longer as prominent.
Another example would be issues surrounding the Olympic Games, specified as claims about the female boxer Imane Khelif, which were later debunked. This subject gained crucial traction and seemed credible to many citizens and respondents but yet faded away.
However, there are long-term issues that, while temporarily little prominent, persist over time. These include disinformation related to climate change and the anti-Western agenda. By this, I mean false and critical claims about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and peculiarly the United States. Additionally, home political issues in the Czech Republic stay a consistent origin of disinformation.
And regarding the Olympic Games, could this also, at its core, reflect a kind of fresh conservative agenda?
We can link it there, but I don’t think the people who registered false claims about the sex of Iman Khalif were solely self-proclaimed conservatives or aligned with a far-right agenda. Rather, it resonated with a large part of society across various groups. This issue hit quite a few buttons at erstwhile but wasn’t long-lasting. I don’t think many people would even remember it now.
You mentioned the monthly questionnaire. Who are the mark respondents?
The general population, everybody who is 16 years old or older.
Are the respondents being asked which disinformation narratives they encounter?
Yes, we mostly focus on media literacy at CEDMO, and disinformation is simply a part of that. We conduct a long-term survey with a detailed questionnaire. any questions are asked periodically, others 2 or 3 times a year, and any aim to map current issues.
We’ve been fortunate to survey a typical example of the Czech population all month, allowing us to track long-term developments, the trustworthiness and credibility of disinformation, and to observe how current events spark varying levels of interest.
How salient are disinformation narratives? In another words, how resilient is Czech society against them, or how frequently does it fall for specified lies?
What we do is gather prominent disinformation from our partners—false claims circulating in Czech media and especially on social media. We then test whether our respondents have come across these claims and measure to what degree they find them credible.
Generally, the credibility of each claim averages around 10%. However, any claims are both more prominent and more credible. These frequently affect a mixture of issues. Disinformation becomes peculiarly persuasive erstwhile it combines multiple topics—for example, linking the European Union with the environmentalist agenda or issues related to the Green Deal.
The variety of misinformation is vast. erstwhile credibility reaches around 40%, it warrants closer attention and focused debunking, possibly even informing policymakers. For example, we late surveyed respondents about a false claim circulating that a Polish investigation squad found carbon dioxide emissions have no effect on global warming. We discovered this claim was credible to 32% of the Czech population—nearly one-third, which is striking.
It’s not only about circumstantial issues; it can besides reflect general skepticism regarding economical matters. For example, the false claim that the Czech Republic is little economically developed than Bangladesh was credible to 47% of our respondents – almost half the population.
While any disinformation, like the claim that EU regulations mandate adding insects to flour, has very low credibility (trusted by only a tiny number of people), another claims resonate more strongly. These more credible narratives, peculiarly those reaching around 40% credibility, are the ones we request to address.
It was most likely easy to debunk.
It was, but still, almost half of our population found this claim credible. That’s a striking number. That’s 1 of the highest numbers we’ve always measured. erstwhile a false communicative combines elements like an anti-government agenda with the general atmosphere of skepticism in our population, it becomes importantly more credible and widespread.
What are the main sources of this information, the main actors that produce and stand behind this information, like the countries, organizations, politicians?
It’s very hard for people to remember the circumstantial origin of a claim they’ve encountered. We ask this all month, and most respondents are incapable to identify the exact media outlet where they saw the disinformation. Only about one-fifth of respondents can callback the source. These claims are mostly encountered on social media networks but besides in general mass media.
About one-fifth or less, actually—it varies each month, ranging between 12 and 20 percent. People can usually identify the kind of media where they encountered the disinformation, specified as a news outlet, Facebook, or Instagram.
Interestingly, 1 little prominent but inactive present origin of disinformation we’ve investigated is chain emails—widely forwarded emails. These were more common before the emergence of social networking sites, and we assumed they had mostly disappeared. However, we found that they inactive mark the aged population.
Many aged individuals receive these emails, and any even forward them. This method of communication has a certain mass effect: about one-third of the population inactive receives chain emails. Most people don’t trust the origin or the information, but about 12% of this group—roughly 3% of the general population—actively forwards emails containing alternate information about political or global issues.
This phenomenon is not very prominent overall, but it persists within tiny social bubbles, especially among aged individuals who may not be fluent in utilizing social networking sites. For them, this serves as an alternate communication channel.
You mentioned the media that are being utilized for spreading disinformation, but who stays behind?
When we think of disinformation, we frequently imagine there’s an actor deliberately spreading it, likely due to the fact that we tend to associate it with war contexts, specified as the propaganda from the Second planet War.
And from Russia’s war on Ukraine nowadays, as part of the hybrid war.
Yes, definitely. We see the spread of that in our country as well. However, most of the time, the sources cited by our respondents are the general mass media. They identify claims as disinformative based on how they measure the information they receive.
It’s problematic to pinpoint “honest” information—not due to the fact that respondents are dishonest, but due to the fact that they perceive certain claims as disinformative, which, in any cases, they might be. However, they don’t necessarily admit disinformation as something fulfilling an agenda. For many, it’s simply a false claim or widespread lie.
I wouldn’t say there’s always 1 circumstantial individual or organization spreading disinformation. any narratives fulfill agendas related to home politics, and these are among the most prominent examples of targeted disinformation. Others focus on global issues, peculiarly the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which is presently a major topic.
Additionally, any disinformation serves an anti-Western agenda. While I’m generalizing, as these narratives encompass various issues, they are crucial and frequently stem from smaller groups or actors. Still, much of the disinformation we see is closely tied to home political issues.
It’s frequently said that state actors, like Russia or China, don’t necessarily make their own narratives, but they alternatively exploit existing divisions within societies. For example, Russia’s influence on the 2016 U.S. elections active promoting disinformation supporting both Democratic and Republican narratives. The goal wasn’t to take sides but to amplify tensions, misunderstandings, and hatred. Is that happening in Czechia?
There are surely instances of disinformation or general confusion regarding public issues originating from abroad. However, even with topics like the Russian war in Ukraine, many of the false narratives and disinformation are spread by home actors who have vested interests in these issues.
In the Czech context—though this may not be unique to our country—we observe a polarization of the population regarding the situation in Ukraine. This doesn’t mean the population is evenly divided between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian stances.
In fact, about 40% of Czechs want Ukraine to win the war, while around 10% express explicit support for Russia. The remaining 50% are ambiguous. They might not outright state that Ukraine should regain all its territories, nor do they advocate for Russia to take control of Ukraine. Instead, they express a desire for peace as shortly as possible.
This polarization is influenced by our political dynamics. The current government firmly supports Ukraine, at least rhetorically. Meanwhile, the opposition, in trying to differentiate itself, is compelled to take countering stances. Agreeing with the government would destruct the divides they usage in their campaigns.
This has led many home actors to invest in narratives around the war in Ukraine. Additionally, this focus on abroad affairs serves as a distraction from pressing home issues, specified as the state of the economy, social justice, and another matters straight affecting Czech citizens.
There are parliamentary elections scheduled in Czechia in October. Do you see these elections influencing the disinformation landscape?
I think we’ll start seeing more of that in the coming months. Campaigns tend to intensify in the months leading up to the election, so I’m prepared for a emergence in disinformation narratives circulating during that time.
Still, it will become much harder to monitor. Disinformation will be produced at a much faster pace, with any narratives resonating more than others. The situation will grow increasingly complex.
This will besides be challenging due to the fact that the elections are, I believe, scheduled for early October—right after the summertime months, erstwhile the population isn’t as focused on political issues. This could make it harder to identify and address false claims in time.
It will be crucial to stay actively active in monitoring the situation and ensuring the Czech population has access to accurate, applicable information—not just debunking false claims, but promoting truthful narratives that contribute meaningfully to the public debate.
Based on what you’ve mentioned regarding national versus possible external actors spreading disinformation, should we focus more internally on home sources of disruption? Do you besides see any regional or broader transnational disinformation campaigns operating in Czechia? Something larger than just 1 country?
I think most of the issues I mentioned are international, especially erstwhile we talk about the anti-Western agenda. We see this in many countries, peculiarly in Central and east Europe.
The issues surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine are besides prominent in many European countries, not just in the east. These topics are widespread, and we do see any overlap in disinformation. We have data from Slovakia and Poland, and we announcement that any of the disinformation circulating in Czechia is besides being registered in those countries. So we can see that the spread is targeting multiple European nations.
Yes, these narratives are part of an agenda aimed at confusing the general population across Europe—causing them to lose focus on key issues and weakening their ability to discern what’s actual from what’s false. This disorientation makes it harder for people to realize the situation clearly.
While these campaigns might be organized from abroad, most of what we see here comes from home actors. This is partially due to the fact that erstwhile a abroad country tries to actively spread disinformation in Czechia, it’s easier to uncover due to language barriers, contextual differences, and the communication streams involved.
However, any of these attempts are more successful in private group chats via apps like Telegram or Signal, where the barriers to detection are lower. So possibly WhatsApp to any extent. These platforms are harder to monitor due to the fact that you request to be part of the group chat to know what’s being shared there.
However, they don’t typically mark a large audience. Instead, they tend to focus on smaller groups, which can then spread the claims they’ve encountered through another media channels. And in these cases, the actors behind the disinformation are domestic.
And what is the most widespread fake news presently in circulation?
Well, as I mentioned, the most widespread disinformation tends to revolve around temporary issues. Recently, we asked our respondents about the most common disinformation narratives they had encountered.
One of the claims that stood out was from our prime minister. It received crucial media attention. He stated that if re-elected, he would guarantee that, within 4 years, salaries in the Czech Republic would be on par with those in Germany. This claim was widely mocked.
People mostly identified it as false, as disinformation. I’m not saying it’s absolutely false, although it seems beautiful clear that it is. But yes, this is 1 of the more prominent examples.
It can besides be defined as wishful thinking.
Yes, you could say that. “Fake it until you make it,” perhaps. But that’s most likely not what you’re looking for. The most prominent issues revolve around Ukraine, and the second-largest group pertains to the evaluation of the current government.
A comparatively equal number of respondents reported encountering disinformation against the current government as those who encountered disinformation supporting it. So, there’s most likely any underlying conflict taking place among our respondents. But that’s something they find interesting, and it’s why we request to focus on this issue as well.
How would you specify the unique character of the disinformation scenery in the Czech Republic?
I think, to any extent, it’s heavy influenced by polarization. People reflect this polarization in their beliefs, meaning they choose a side and read information that aligns with it. While polarization is present everywhere, what’s unique here is how closely it’s linked to political issues.
Despite the political arena being scattered, with so many parties—many on the center-right, both liberal and conservative—there are fewer left-wing parties, and any that are politically ambiguous, people frequently perceive it as a two-camp fight. That’s rather circumstantial to our country.
Additionally, any crucial issues discussed in many European countries are untouched or unchallenged here, peculiarly environmental concerns. For example, the focus is mostly on electrical vehicles and the Green Deal, which are comparatively marginal in the broader climate change discourse. I’m not saying they are entirely marginal, but they don’t represent the full scope of the issue.
Another circumstantial aspect is the divide surrounding the Ukraine invasion. Unlike Poland, where the population is mostly in favour of Ukraine’s defensive efforts, the Czech Republic’s stance is more complicated. It’s not so much that people support Russia, but they just want the war to end at any cost.
What’s being done to counter disinformation in Czechia, and what more would you recommend?
There are various approaches to improving general media literacy, and I’ve seen affirmative results, especially erstwhile communicating with younger respondents. They are frequently educated on these issues and know how to admit false information, verify facts, and gather information from multiple sources. That’s encouraging to see.
However, there’s a crucial disparity in the education strategy across regions in Czechia, which affects media literacy. It’s mostly much better in urban centers like Prague and Brno, but the situation is worse in any border regions. This is something that policymakers, as well as the non-governmental sector, should target.
Another approach I’d propose is increased cooperation between media outlets. Disinformation spreads much faster on social networks than the fact does, and people frequently trust what they see or hear first. It’s crucial to spread accurate information, and cooperation among mass media outlets can aid accomplish this. The more they work together to present news and explain situations to the public, the higher the chances that people will registry the correct information.
You can read more about the disinformation scenery in Czechia here.
