“There’s no surge in presidential election disinformation yet, but experiences from countries like Germany and Romania show that vigilance is key,” Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski told EURACTIV.pl’s fact Talks podcast.
IN BRIEF: Disinformation in Poland
- Dominant narrations: related to wellness (including vaccines), war in Ukraine
- Who spreads disinformation: Russia, Belarus, home politicians and influencers
- Most common fake news: doctors misinform about health, vaccines are harmful to human health, Rossiya is defending itself in Ukraine, Russia is the victim of the war and not the aggressor, the Bucha massacre was fabricated by Western media, the supply of Starlink network to Ukraine leads to the escalation of the war
- Combating disinformation: supporting fact-checking organisation and free media, collaboration with political parties and online platforms, the works on digital tax.
Today, we research Poland’s disinformation scenery with Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski, Polish Minister of Digital Affairs.
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: Poland, like another countries of the European Union, is struggling with the problem of disinformation. What are the dominant disinformation narratives in our country today?
Krzysztof Gawkowski: There are respective aspects to this phenomenon. First and foremost, these narratives aim to arouse negative emotions, set citizens against each other, deepen polarization, while frequently distorting reality – in simple terms, their goal is to convince people to believe in lies.
Disinformation occurs in a variety of areas, with healthcare being 1 of the most common targets. Examples include stories suggesting that doctors are not telling the fact or that medical investigation on diseases is fabricated. There are besides widespread panics, specified as the vaccine scare, which claims that all vaccine is deadly – this phenomenon is inactive present.
Another crucial area of disinformation is the war in Ukraine. Efforts are being made to represent Russia as a country that had to defend itself, alternatively than as an aggressor pursuing an expansionist policy. Among these distortions is the claim that Americans see Russia as a victim alternatively than an aggressor. In addition, any narratives claim that no crimes were committed in Bucha and that everything was fabricated by the Western media.
Disinformation besides affects issues that are only applicable for a fewer days, but can have a real impact. 1 example is the run against Starlink, which suggested that providing net access to Ukraine was harmful due to the fact that it would escalate the war – ignoring the fact that without net access, Ukraine could collapse.
What about disinformation related to the presidential campaign*?
So far, we have not seen an increase in specified disinformation, but we are closely monitoring the online space. We have launched a peculiar protection program to safeguard the elections. This initiative involves not only the National Election Office (KBW), but besides cooperation with online platforms to identify any attempts to mislead or manipulate voters.
We are besides in contact with election committees. While we have not yet seen a crucial increase in election-related disinformation, experience from another countries, specified as Germany and Romania, shows that vigilance is necessary. The closer we get to the elections, the greater the hazard that abroad actors, peculiarly Russia, will effort to influence the campaign.
Who are the main actors liable for spreading disinformation in Poland?
Besides state actors specified as Russia and Belarus, disinformation is besides spread by any politicians, influencers, and even certain figures within our own country.
Since I took office at the Ministry of Digital Affairs, we have recognized disinformation as 1 of the most pressing challenges that must be effectively countered. This includes both external operations and interior ones—where falsehoods already circulating in the Polish public sphere are repeated.
We have established a dedicated disinformation prevention unit at NASK (Research and Academic Computer Network), which operates completely independently of political influence and focuses on responding to critical situations. We work closely with operators and online platforms to detect false information and respond publically by pointing out where misinformation appears.
During the 2024 elections—both local and European—we managed to effectively defend Poland from major disinformation campaigns. While specified cases always occur, I believe we can accomplish akin results this year. Unfortunately, politicians themselves frequently contribute to spreading disinformation by making statements that contradict facts, which can reenforce narratives like those promoted by Russia. For example, claims that no crimes were committed in Bucha or statements suggesting that Ukraine should surrender quickly.
Is the government afraid that the Digital Services Act might be seen as a form of censorship?
Of course, any voices claim that this bill introduces a form of censorship, which is completely false – another fake news story. The Digital Services Act is designed to guarantee that the net is free of lies and illegal content. And just like in any country, there should be individual in charge of holding people accountable for spreading illegal content, individual who can say: „This is simply a lie.”
How does the government plan to support fact-checking organizations?
We want to support fact-checking organizations so that they can proceed to debunk falsehoods spread by politicians, influencers, and various lobbying groups acting in the interests of abroad states. This is critical due to the fact that disinformation is increasing all year, and the scope of its influence is expanding. We are investing crucial resources and effort in campaigns and digital literacy to aid people admit disinformation.
Are you planning any programs to support the media, especially in the fight against disinformation?
Yes, we are working on programs to support the media. 1 of the key initiatives I am working on is the digital tax, which could be utilized to support conventional media. This taxation would make funds that could be utilized for media, startups, artificial intelligence development, e-government services, and another areas related to digitalization.
* The first circular of the Polish presidential election will take place on Sunday, May 18, 2025. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a runoff will be held on June 1, 2025.
You can learn more about the disinformation in Poland here.
