ADAM REICHARDT: We spent the last 2 days here in Kraków talking about disinformation, Russian disinformation and Russian interference in our societies. I would like to start by asking you about the EU High-Level Expert Group on Disinformation, in which you participated back in 2018, and what you think we have learned since then?
CHRISTOPHE LECLERCQ: I think we have very much improved the analysis of Russian disinformation and another sources of disinformation. We have improved the level of fact-checking and debunking, but we have not made a major impact in terms of the quality of the information space. 1 of the main reasons is that social media platforms dominate the readership and are sources of influence for most people. We stress the quality of media reporting, but actually its own influence is rather limited. There are ways to improve the situation, which were recommended by this high-level expert group on disinformation, but they have not been decently implemented.
As you mentioned, 1 of the key challenges is related to social media platforms, not only limiting the information that we see, but besides spreading bad information. What more can be done? And what are any things you have been working on since?
There have been efforts by any platforms like Facebook to get free of the worst social media accounts and any of the platforms which find what you and I are seeing. It would be possible to influence those algorithms by utilizing not only the current signals that favour “clickability” and the viral possible of posts, but besides reflecting quality. These are called trust indicators. They were recommended in the Code of Practice in 2018 that later led to the Code of Conduct, both endorsed by social media platforms. all yearly study by the European Commission on implementing these codes, however, has shown that it remains to be done. But it would be completely doable. The social media platforms are very good at optimizing the click rate and the advertising revenues they get from social media, but it’s not in their interest to reduce the virality of posts. Basically, fake news tends to be fun and attractive to the audience, so maximizing the advertising volume. The platforms could do it if they are pushed from 2 directions. First, this could come from the policy-makers, and there is now a good legislative framework at the EU level which could be implemented more strictly. And second, companies who do advertising could besides push for their ads not to advance disinformation but to advance quality information so they could usage these trust indicators besides to attribute greater advertising rates and prices compared to another types of content, which means that the platforms could recoup any of the volume they would lose.
I think it’s a very interesting idea. I worry, however, with especially 1 of the main platforms where information is spread, X, formerly known as Twitter, they would be rather against this, besides due to the fact that Elon Musk, who’s been very outspoken, would claim this is an attack on “free speech”.
My summary of the study of this high-level expert group is to avoid censorship, dilute fake news and advance quality content. We have avoided censorship and this would actually not censor, it would just give little visibility to bad-quality information. As for X, it is not in line with EU regulation and it may well lose its ability to operate in Europe if it doesn’t improve. I guess we are in a very peculiar phase, right with the US presidential election and in November possibly Elon Musk will see the light after that.
But quality information is besides a immense challenge in the media environment in general, which is very competitive. We are inundated with information, quite a few which is free. Media outlets should be quick, to break news (often without fact-checking) and get clicks. How can we improve quality in this environment?
I do not want to focus besides much on these trust indicators, but they would besides have a affirmative impact from that viewpoint due to the fact that editors who choose quality versus the click rate will be encouraged by the numbers as they will get a higher rating. This is actually a reason why any publishers of tabloids were reluctant about trust indicators due to the fact that they feared they would be ranked little than top quality newspapers, but they would inactive be much better rated than Russia present or any kind of unknown sources. So it’s all in comparative terms. Another component regarding quality is the importance of harnessing artificial intelligence under the control of editors. For me this is the next immense challenge for the media sector. We have been more or little absorbed by the internet. It has taken years and unfortunately we lost half of the journalists in Europe in this era. Now artificial intelligence is even more of a challenge and of course the media has to usage artificial intelligence in order to improve its productivity and its customization, while leaving the parameters in the hands of journalists, of human beings, following a framework and values. To do that, we request to improve the resilience of the media sector. And I’m not reasoning just of regulation of law and protecting journalists but being able to pay them well. Therefore, the question is how to improve the business models of the media sector.
This subject of business models is very critical due to the fact that I think media is going through any kind of transformation right now and we gotta besides pay attention to not let quality journalism to be victim to the changing models. What are some, if you have any, suggestions on business models that would advance quality media in Europe? Can it be considered a way to fight against disinformation?
I would mention in the spirit of brevity just 3 things. First of all, the public sector has a function to play. It’s legitimate to have public broadcasters, for example. Secondly, fresh models can be explored, specified as the philanthropy model. There is simply a general interest in any types of journalism, for example, solutions journalism which is about looking not only at the negatives of what’s happening in our societies. Thirdly, we always think about business models and revenues. Let’s look at the cost side as well, due to the fact that if we don’t, it’s the number of journalists that will be reduced. I believe that the media sector in Europe is far besides fragmented compared to another service industries. There are besides many players. It’s not sustainable and so I think we will have more consolidation.
Basically, there are 3 possible paths. The first, unfortunately, is to cease operations, which has already happened to many media outlets. The second option is to cooperate, sharing costs and accelerating innovation. This is the spirit behind programmes like Stars4Media, supported by the EU, which my think-do-tank, Europe’s Media Lab, has developed. The 3rd way is to merge, which is why I integrated the policy-focused media outlet Euractiv into the Mediahuis group. I realized that investing the vast amounts required for artificial intelligence and innovation would be beyond my individual capacity. Typically, media concentration is opposed in the name of pluralism, and it’s actual that if it occurs at a national level between akin outlets, it frequently results in 1 outlet disappearing, cutting the editorial staff in half. However, if it involves cross-border mergers – uniting outlets that are aligned in political orientation, mark audience or technology – then it can be a very powerful strategy.
We’ve talked a lot about media and I think it’s very applicable in the context of fighting Russian disinformation, but let’s come back to the Russian disinformation subject and look at any of the another solutions that may be useful for us in Europe to become more resilient. What are any ideas that you have or have been working on?
I would regroup them into 2 categories. First of all, I’ve learned a lot at this conference organized in Kraków by the Jagiellonian University. And I would say the first category of solutions is in gathering evidence and sharing information, and possibly bundling together more of the various initiatives which exist. I tend to call the planet of fact-checking and debunking a cottage industry, but it needs to grow to industrial strength, much like the platforms themselves. This is inactive what I would call the reactive approach, being on the defence, protecting from Russian disinformation. The another kind of approach is possibly more delicate but 1 I think we request to adopt: proactively winning the information warfare conflict while evidently not losing our values. There are red lines – it’s not about lying – but the same information can be presented in different ways. We should consider utilizing micro-targeting, as the Russians do, to engage with our different Russian-speaking audiences, both the diaspora and inside the country. We may want to choose the topics carefully.
There are topics which are more in line with the conventional values of Russia and why not usage them. We besides have people with conventional values in the West who may be better spokespeople to the Russian audiences than highly progressive audiences. So let’s effort to build bridges with the Russians. I’m not talking about the Kremlin, due to the fact that I would not hope for much change there, but I’m talking about the educated mediate class in Moscow and St Petersburg, which is the key to any change in Russia. The diaspora left from those circles, and there are inactive millions of people in St Petersburg and Moscow, could support or even trigger change in Russia as it has done in the past. There have been revolutions in Russia, why not another one?
There is besides exile media, Russian and Belarusian exile media, which has been trying to take this approach to scope the audiences inside the country. Is Europe doing adequate to support them in helping them scope specified audiences?
I think not. And the question is highly relevant. Legally, they are now EU media due to the fact that most of them have been established within the EU. But of course, they should besides be handled as addressing Russian-speaking audiences, not only domestically but besides in Russia itself. So far, if I talk about the EU support programmes, they are besides tiny and they are besides divided between home EU programmes and abroad EU programmes. I’m in favour of streamlining this due to the fact that there are large programmes like, for example, the journalism partnership, part of Creative Europe, which should be open to media with roots in east Europe, so beyond the current membership of the EU. I hope this will be done as part of the fresh mandate with the fresh European Commission. We have lobbied for having a democracy commissioner in an op-ed published on Project Syndicate. And we are fortunate due to the fact that we will actually get 2 democracy commissioners, 1 besides in charge of justice and the another one, importantly, in charge of digital sovereignty. 1 commissioner comes from Finland, so a frontline country, and I have large expectations for what she could be triggering in terms of beginning specified programmes. In addition, I think it would be crucial to have many more journalists in Brussels covering EU and NATO affairs, both for east European countries, and I’ll specify what they could be, and separately for Belarus and besides for Russian exile media. so we, Europe’s Media Lab, have developed this programme Maison du Médialab. It is aimed at tripling the number of Brussels correspondents from Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia. Tripling sounds like a immense number, but actually it’s starting from a very tiny base. For example, Moldova has no correspondents in Brussels. It is amazing erstwhile you think of the importance of the EU and NATO for them, and Ukraine has only 5 which is much little than there was from Poland 10 years before enlargement. So this is rather doable. Russian exile media should be treated differently, but equally supported. I think there are grounds for having a akin strategy for Russian exile media in Brussels so that they get closer to EU institutions, while inactive retaining their independency and their separate voice. They may well be patriotic, they may well have different views from Ukrainians, but at least they should study in a fact-based way on what’s going on in the EU and besides in NATO.
Is there anything else that you wanted to cover before we finish?
I think it is crucial to consider not only the mainstream media, large broadcasters and general newspapers which have transformed themselves on the internet. There is besides a large function to play for niche media, specified as New east Europe, Euractiv, Politico, many others, due to the fact that they, in turn, inform the mainstream journalists. Very often, the topics which are covered on tv have been covered the day before by mainstream newspapers and a week before by specialized publications. So there is simply a function to play besides for our kind of policy media.
This interview took place during the conference titled “Shadows of Truth: Decoding Russia’s Disinformation Campaigns”, which was co-organized by LSE IDEAS CSEEP at the Jagiellonian University and fresh east Europe.
Christophe Leclercq is simply a erstwhile management consultant and EU official. He is the founder of the EURACTIV media network and the Executive Chair of Europe’s MediaLab (Fondation EURACTIV). He was a associate of the 2018 EU “High-Level Expert Group on disinformation”, and is now on the Advisory Council of EDMO (European Digital Media Observatory, managed by EUI in Florence).
Adam Reichardt is the editor in chief of New east Europe and co-host of the Talk east Europe podcast.
