“The Kremlin’s messaging has shifted dramatically—from years of portraying the United States and NATO as the chief aggressors manipulating a hapless European Union, to now casting the EU and NATO as the primary enemies while conspicuously leaving the US out of the picture,” Dr Ralitsa Kovacheva of Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski told EURACTIV.pl’s fact Talks podcast.
IN BRIEF: Disinformation in Bulgaria
- Dominant narratives: anti-Euro, related to the war in Ukraine, “pro-peace”, nostalgic about the Communist times
- Who spreads disinformation: the Kremlin, pro-Russian outlets, social media accounts and another actors, Donald Trump, Bulgarian politicians (including the president)
- Most common fake news: the government, the US or the EU leading Bulgaria into war, pushing for peace at any cost, the EU and NATO being the warmongers, Volodymyr Zelenskyy being illegitimate Ukrainian president, adopting the Euro currency will lead to greater inflation and higher prices, Croatians regretting joining the Eurozone, life utilized to be better in socialist times, Ukraine should not be admitted to NATO
- Combatting disinformation: fact-checking, NGO activity
Joining us present to research Luxembourg’s disinformation scenery with Dr Ralitsa Kovacheva—doctor of journalism and an associate prof. in global journalism at the Faculty of Journalism and Mass Communication at Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski.
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: Disinformation takes different shapes across Europe, frequently exploiting circumstantial social, political, or historical sensitivities. In Bulgaria, what are the most prevalent disinformation narratives?
Dr Ralitsa Kovacheva: A peculiar aspect of Bulgaria’s case is that the COVID crisis and the war in Ukraine coincided with a prolonged political crisis, marked by frequent parliamentary elections and short terms of government.
This created a situation where home political issues were intertwined with European and global political matters. Disinformation regarding the war, Ukraine itself, and the European Union was frequently utilized to attack the government.
It’s hard to view these various types of disinformation separately. The main narratives, I believe, are akin to those in another east European countries. In terms of the war in Ukraine, 1 of the most persistent narratives is that the government, the United States, or the European Union—depending on the source—are dragging us into war.
This communicative appeared early on, and I saw it just minutes ago, inactive active on social media. Whenever Ukraine is discussed in Bulgaria—whether it’s about military aid, political support, or, for example, a gathering in Brussels—these narratives take on fresh life.
Another origin contributing to the revival of these narratives is president Donald Trump, who repeated major Kremlin disinformation and legitimised it. Now, many Bulgarian political actors, including the president, are saying that this is the „truth” about the war and about Ukraine. So, they advocate siding with president Trump and pushing for what is called „peace,” which, in reality, would be a capitulation to Russian terms.
Bulgaria’s political parties and society are profoundly divided on these issues, and this division has persisted for 3 years. For example, our prime minister said, „In Ukraine, you’re not alone,” while the president advocates for peace and supports Donald Trump, portraying the European Union as a warmonger. There’s a clear opposition to the European position of aiding Ukraine militarily.
You mentioned earlier that the government was being attacked for dragging Bulgaria into the war, utilizing the European Union and the U.S. synonymously. So, I realize that, in the beginning, during Biden’s time, the US was treated as the warmonger putting Bulgaria and Europe in danger.
Yes. We can see this change in Russian narratives. It’s very apparent how the United States was the main evil actor in this propaganda for years. It was the United States and NATO as the aggressors, the evil ones, and the European Union was just a puppet—poor, stupid Europeans being led to demolition by the Americans. Now, the Kremlin says the opposite. They say the European Union and NATO are the foes, but without mentioning the United States. It’s very obvious.
So what’s characteristic of Bulgaria, which differs from another countries, is the treatment of the U.S. during the Biden era as a organization dragging Europe and Bulgaria into war. another countries would focus more on the European Union, or Brussels, as the bad liberals against the peace camp. So what would you say is the major disinformation communicative today?
Well, too the narratives related to the war in Ukraine, which are typical Russian narratives—like the thought that they are dragging us into the war—the Bulgarian parliament already voted on a declaration saying that we will, in no case, send troops to Ukraine.
The thought was to form something like peace-supporting forces, not to send soldiers to fight at the front, but still, the Bulgarian parliament voted to declare that we will not send troops to Ukraine.
Also, there’s the delegitimisation of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which was supported by Donald Trump and has now resurfaced as a communicative in Bulgaria.
Another popular and very persistent communicative is the run against adopting the Euro, since Bulgaria is almost ready to enter the Eurozone. For over 2 years, there has been a strong run against it, led by a populist, pro-Russian parliamentary party. This run besides has widespread popular support because, erstwhile people are poor, they fear becoming even poorer.
While we can realize these people’s feelings, it’s apparent that the run is orchestrated and spreading disinformation about the Euro, about prices, about inflation, and even suggesting that Croatia is suffering due to adopting the Euro.
There’s besides a communicative comparing Bulgaria to Poland, saying that if the Euro is so good, why hasn’t Poland accepted it? Therefore, we should not accept it either.
How do all these disinformation narratives resonate with the public? Are people in Bulgaria susceptible to this disinformation and these narratives?
In theory, they are vulnerable. We have any predispositions—cultural and historical, for example. You know, our language is close to Russian, we share any historical moments, and we besides have a common russian communist past.
There’s a feeling among many people that they “know” Russia. I don’t know how, but they’re convinced that Russia could not possibly do something incorrect to Bulgaria or be at fault. We besides have a problem with education.
Our results on the PISA tests are very low. We besides rank very low on the media literacy index, which means that people are not equipped to navigate the digital information space or to recognise false and harmful information.
At the same time, present I saw a fresh sociological poll indicating that support among Bulgarians for EU membership has increased—from 57% to 61%. According to the polling agency, this is close to the historical highest of specified support.
So possibly this shows that—in a way, people are not as susceptible as they may seem. Ultimately, they are capable of recognising, let’s say, the bright side of the story—the truth—as opposed to disinformation.
And possibly this is the most crucial thing: what people actually think, and how they will vote —or what decisions they will make. That’s what truly matters—not what they’re posting on Facebook, for example. due to the fact that if we look only at social media, we might easy conclude that all Bulgarians are pro-Russian and anti-European. But I don’t think that’s the case. It’s only the apparent picture.
Who are the main actors creating or spreading disinformation in Bulgaria?
As is the case in another east European countries—and possibly not only in east Europe—the main actors presently spreading disinformation are the same ones who were spreading disinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic. They kind of switched overnight to become pro-Russian disinformers—the same pages, groups, and individuals on social media.
Now they actively spread disinformation about the euro or content related to Russia and the war in Ukraine. But the bigger problem isn’t social media itself—it’s that these narratives, which are not always outright lies but frequently Kremlin propaganda talking points, are repeated and legitimised by Bulgarian politicians.
It’s a twisted interpretation, not necessarily false facts. These narratives and talking points are echoed in Bulgarian political discourse—we hear the same things in parliamentary debates—we hear the same things from the Bulgarian president. And it’s very hard to debunk this kind of communicative due to the fact that it doesn’t affect simply correcting a falsehood.
It’s not just about saying, “This is wrong—here are the real facts.” For example, Russia has been promoting a circumstantial explanation of “peace” for 2 years now—an thought that Ukraine should forget about its occupied territories, surrender, and wait for Russia to attack again.
Now this explanation is echoed by Donald Trump, who late said “no NATO for Ukraine” and “no return of occupied lands.” And here in Bulgaria, we have political actors—including the president—who support this imagination of peace. But that imagination is fundamentally manipulated in substance. Still, technically, it is not disinformation.
And why do you think they do this? Why are they now following Donald Trump in spreading what is fundamentally Russian disinformation? How do they benefit from it?
I think the usage and spread of Russian disinformation and propaganda has always been about political convenience. any political actors trust on it to gain voter support. I’m not convinced that all of them are actual believers in the Kremlin or fans of Vladimir Putin. It’s more about usefulness.
It’s part of this populist communication strategy—collecting whatever is useful at a given minute to attract voters, gain social media followers, or attack the government. all time the Bulgarian government decides to send military aid to Ukraine, these narratives—like “they’re dragging us into war”—reach a peak.
So it’s part of an interior home political fight between the government and the opposition—regardless of which parties are in government or opposition.
How would you specify the circumstantial or unique character of the disinformation scenery in Bulgaria?
We’ve discussed this issue with many colleagues from another Central and east European countries. possibly the country most akin to Bulgaria in this respect is Slovakia. And it’s very interesting to consider why that is.
I’m not certain I have a definitive answer, but possibly 1 reason is that in both Bulgaria and Slovakia, political parties, politicians, and even government representatives act as megaphones for disinformation.
It’s seen as a legitimate point of view in our countries. I can talk about Bulgaria—I’m not certain about Slovakia—but for example, you don’t see the same warm feelings toward the russian Union in Poland as you do in Bulgaria.
The disinformation narratives we’ve been discussing are always supported by a constant underlying communicative about Bulgaria’s “great socialist past”—how good life was under socialism, how inexpensive everything was, how smart Bulgarians were back then, and how the healthcare system, for instance, was better.
This fuels dissatisfaction with the present government and at the same time fosters a affirmative association between the russian Union and today’s Russia, generating warm feelings toward the latter.
From the Polish point of view, I must say that we are fundamentally cut off from communism and are fundamentally anti-communist. We have besides been very anti-Russian. However, with Trump’s second coming, our right-wing opposition—PiS, and yes, fundamentally most of all, PiS—are besides embracing disinformation narratives that align with what Russia is trying to spread. So, while being anti-Russian, we have embraced pro-Russian, Trumpian narratives. The effect is fundamentally the same, but these populists—right-wing populists—are not in power, as they are, for example, in Slovakia. That’s the difference. So probably, who is in power—and hence has the megaphone of the government—is what matters.
Yes, who is in power is very important. And due to the frequent changes in the Bulgarian government, different parties sometimes control positions. For example, we now have a organization that was branded as the most Euro-Atlantic, powerfully supporting Ukraine, even wanting to send ammunition.
And now, after Trump re-emerged, this same organization says: no military aid to Ukraine, the money should go to Bulgarians. precisely the same communicative as Donald Trump. So yes, this „Trump disease” is everywhere.
You mentioned crucial things, like the emergence in support for the European Union within Bulgarian society. What is being done to limit the vulnerability of Bulgarian society to disinformation? And what more would you recommend?
Unfortunately, not much has been done over the years. It started during the COVID-19 pandemic, erstwhile the government decided to stay quiet and not debunk the disinformation circulating about the virus.
That coincided with parliamentary elections—we had 3 in 2021, for example. And since Bulgarians are mostly reluctant to get vaccinated, political parties decided not to advance vaccines, fearing they might lose voters. Then, erstwhile the war in Ukraine started, any political parties chose to stay silent. If not openly supporting Russia, they at least didn’t do anything to counter disinformation narratives.
We created a fact-checking organisation in Bulgaria—factcheck.bg. It’s inactive active and working. I was part of the squad for 3 years. That has been 1 of the most sustainable efforts to combat disinformation. Of course, there are also media outlets trying to do something too.
But these efforts are fragmented and mostly non-governmental. And in Bulgaria—as in any another European countries—NGOs are under attack. They’re accused of being funded by abroad governments, labeled as abroad agents.
This Russian communicative is very popular in Bulgaria. So it has become much harder to work in this space and to convince the broader public that what these organizations are doing is good and useful.
From the government side, I’m afraid we see nothing sustainable or convincing being done to combat these narratives. And it’s impossible to do so if the Prime Minister says 1 thing, and the president says another. I’m not certain how you debunk anything in that kind of environment.
If Bulgaria were a better place, what would you urge as the most important—and possibly simplest—solutions?
There are no simple solutions. But ideally, I’d like Bulgaria to have a strong government and a pro-European parliament, and to take a strong position in making the European Union stronger. due to the fact that I believe the worst thing that could happen to Bulgaria is for the European Union to become weak and divided.
You can learn more about the disinformation scenery in Bulgaria here.
