In Latvia, May 9 remains a profoundly polarising date—celebrated in Russia as triumph Day, it is seen by many Latvians as a symbol of russian reoccupation, highlighting the enduring divide over historical memory, Anete Bērzkalne of Latvijas Radio told EURACTIV.pl’s fact Talks podcast.
IN BRIEF: Disinformation in Latvia
- Dominant narratives: related to NATO, the EU, national politics and policies, defence, Ukraine, health
- Main disinformation spreaders: Russia, cultural Russians in Latvia, Russia-linked media (e.g. Voice of Europe), home populists
- Most common fake news: by reinforcing its security, Latvia risks escalating tensions with Russia, the EU being dominated by France and Germany, with smaller states like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia being powerless, the EU being divided and ineffectual, Latvian government being highly ineffective and untrustworthy in its decision-making, Latvian state being repressive, resurgence in extremist nationalist ideologies
- Combating disinformation: prohibiting the retransmission of Russian and Belarusian tv channels, blocking broadcasters and websites, state-organised framework of tackling information threats, the activity of NGOs, fostering media literacy, supporting local media, rebuilding trust in journalism
In this episode, we research Latvia’s disinformation scenery with Anete Bērzkalne, Disinformation investigator and Fact-Checker at Latvijas Radio, which is part of the Latvian Public Service Media.
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: Latvia has long been on the front line erstwhile it comes to countering disinformation, especially given its geopolitical position and Russian-language media environment. From your perspective, what are the dominant disinformation narratives circulating in Latvia, and how have they evolved in fresh years?
I would say that in the case of Latvia, there are many disinformation narratives that have been circulating for a long time—particularly, as you already mentioned, due to our proximity to Russia.
Also, due to our shared past and the fact that a large part of the Latvian population speaks and understands Russian, we are peculiarly vulnerable. There are besides unique characteristics in the media scenery that play a role.
One of the longest-running and most persistent disinformation narratives, which has intensified since the invasion of Ukraine, concerns NATO. Specifically, there’s a consistent effort to represent NATO as a weak organization—suggesting that it wouldn’t defend us in the event of an attack.
So essentially, the message being pushed is that there’s small point in being part of NATO because, if Russia invades, NATO will not come to our defense. This communicative sows fear among Latvians.
Another common theme, especially related to safety and defense, is the thought that by strengthening our defenses, we’re provoking Russia. The message is: “don’t poke the bear.” Therefore, we should refrain from expanding our security, which—conveniently for Russia—would leave us more vulnerable.
We besides see a strong influx of disinformation targeting the EU. This, again, is rather multifaceted. On 1 hand, the EU is portrayed as being dominated by powerful countries—mainly France and Germany—who dictate policy, while smaller countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia supposedly have no real influence. The communicative is that decisions are made by this “big chair,” this German-French axis, and we’re just expected to follow along.
This ties into the fact that, for example, in the last European Parliament elections, voter turnout in Latvia was just under 34%. So there’s clearly a gap in public knowing of how the EU functions, and disinformation takes advantage of this deficiency of awareness. If people don’t realize how the strategy works, they’re more easy manipulated.
Another strand of disinformation portrays the EU as weak and fractured—essentially, on the brink of collapse. And then, due to the fact that Latvia is frequently portrayed in these narratives as a failed state—too weak to be independently—the conclusion they aim to drive us toward is that we should search stronger alliances.
And of course, in these narratives, that “stronger ally” is on our east flank—Russia. The implication is that we should rejoin the post-USSR sphere, reconnect with that region. We see quite a few messaging along these lines. Tied into this is the thought that Latvia is incapable of functioning as a appropriate state.
This blends into ridicule of the Latvian government—not always outright disinformation, but surely influence campaigns designed to undermine trust in our institutions. They represent the Latvian government as grossly incompetent, suggesting we can’t trust its decisions. This only deepens public distrust in the established system.
Finally, especially targeting the Russian-speaking population in Latvia, there’s a recurring communicative about the allegedly oppressive nature of the Latvian state—along with claims of a resurgence of Nazism, which we’ve besides seen utilized in disinformation about Ukraine.
That communicative is besides being actively promoted, and we can see it in current disinformation campaigns as well. And the last major one—though, of course, there are many smaller ones too—has emerged since the COVID-19 pandemic.
I’m certain Latvia is not alone in this, but there’s been a noticeable surge in health-related disinformation. This frequently targets conventional medicine. There’s a reasonably strong anti-vaccination movement—perhaps not as severe as in any another countries—but it’s inactive present.
Of course, this doesn’t just pose a hazard to public wellness and society at large. If people come to genuinely believe that their government is trying to poison or kill them, then naturally, they lose trust in its decision-making and the intentions behind various policies.
That, by default, creates deep distrust in the government. And if individual starts believing in 1 conspiracy theory, it frequently leads to believing in others. It fosters the feeling that everyone is against you and that no 1 can be trusted. So I would say these are the most persistent disinformation narratives we’ve seen over time.
You haven’t mentioned Ukraine. Is Ukraine not besides being targeted by disinformation campaigns—similar to how Latvia is portrayed as a failed state? Is there a communicative that we shouldn’t be supporting Ukraine?
Yes, absolutely. Ukraine is definitely being targeted, but mostly in the context of our support for Ukraine and for Ukrainian refugees. We see disinformation aimed at undermining trust in the Ukrainian government—suggesting, for example, that much of the aid we supply is being misused or sold off, alternatively than helping the Ukrainian people or war effort. The thought being promoted is that Ukraine is run by a corrupt regime.
For instance, there was late a wave of disinformation suggesting that the cars donated to Ukraine were later sold by Ukrainians just to make money. There are besides campaigns targeting Ukrainian refugees. A while back—not besides long ago—there were leaked papers from a social plan agency, fundamentally a disinformation-producing entity in Russia.
Those leaks revealed an explicit intent to spread disinformation targeting Ukrainians in Poland and the Baltic states, with the goal of reducing public support and aid. So yes, we clearly see that kind of activity. But despite this, I believe Latvia’s support for Ukraine remains strong. Both countries share a past of russian occupation, which fosters a deep sense of solidarity.
So we see our support for Ukraine as an investment in our own safety and in Europe’s. While these disinformation efforts exist, I don’t think they’ve been peculiarly successful in convincing people that we shouldn’t support Ukraine. possibly in larger countries without that shared historical experience—or without the same emotional connection—the narratives might have more impact.
How much of this disinformation is bottom-up? That is, how much originates at the grassroots level—ideas people already believe in—and is then amplified by malign actors?
That’s a very interesting question. I would say it’s more top-down alternatively than bottom-up. We tend to see more misinformation arising erstwhile people deficiency access to clear information. That information vacuum creates space for speculation.
If something isn’t well explained, people will form their own explanations—which may not be true. And of course, all of this is amplified by the fact that there’s a large deal of disinformation coming from Russia, which is the primary external origin for specified content in Latvia.
But Latvians are mostly very skeptical of information that comes straight from Russia. So disinformation here wouldn’t typically be explicitly pro-Russian—it would be crafted in a more subtle way.
That’s why, for example, the Ukraine-related disinformation doesn’t usually say we should support Russia directly. Instead, it focuses on reasons why we shouldn’t support Ukraine—an approach that, by extension, serves Russia’s interests.
So it’s not overtly pro-Russian, but the narratives are inactive advantageous to Russia’s geopolitical goals. For instance, by weakening our support for Ukraine, we inadvertently aid Russia. These types of narratives seep into the broader information environment—especially on social media.
And if they’re executed effectively, people begin to believe them and may then spread them further. Still, I’d say the primary origin remains abroad actors. These narratives infiltrate our information space. However, we besides have any local figures who aid spread them—what Russia refers to as its “compatriots.” These are cultural Russians, according to Russia’s own definition of its compatriot policy. any stay in Latvia, others leave the country.
Those who leave frequently present it as a „successful escape” from Latvia’s alleged oppressive regime. They appear on Russian or Belarusian media, take part in podcasts and talk shows, and contribute to disinformation by sharing stories of alleged Nazi revival in Latvia, and another fabricated narratives. They pose as people representing the real voice of Latvian society.
They present themselves as human rights defenders or activists, claiming to talk for the oppressed. So that’s another aspect. But overall, within Latvia, I would say most of what we see is misinformation—driven by confusion and a deficiency of accessible, clear information—rather than deliberate disinformation.
Now I wanted to ask you about the major actors behind creating and spreading disinformation. You’ve already mentioned Russia, but who are the another actors? And also, Russia is most likely not just 1 large disinformation source—maybe there are besides different Russia-related actors?
I mean, Russia inactive remains by far the biggest origin of disinformation in Latvia. And again, as we discussed, it’s due to the fact that they don’t truly even request to do much—because, by default, quite a few people talk Russian.
So in that case… It makes disinformation narratives more believable. For instance, if there’s a disinformation run in Germany, it needs to be localised—like, it should be in German. And that already adds a language barrier. If the translation isn’t great, it can lose trustworthiness.
But in the case of Latvia, these campaigns are frequently in Russian. There’s no request to decently localise them. So Russia is, by default, the biggest disinformation spreader. And it’s just due to the proximity, the language knowledge. quite a few people are utilizing social media, and disinformation that’s randomly spread by Russia can inactive scope Latvian people—even if it’s not specifically targeting Latvia. So from that perspective, it’s kind of a double win for them.
In many another countries we’ve analysed in this podcast series, interior actors—like politicians—are sometimes pointed out as well. What about Latvia?
I mean, yes, there are definitely political actors that spread disinformation. And of course, the intention there isn’t always clear—whether it’s misinformation or disinformation. possibly it’s just to draw attention to themselves. We have a municipal election coming up in June, so possibly it’s for political gain. Yes, there are local political actors involved.
More so, it tends to be populist-leaning individuals spreading false information. The example I mentioned about Ukrainians selling off the cars we donated to them was besides amplified by a political actor. So yes, absolutely—there is false information being spread by people with political backgrounds as well. And we do have fact-checking entities that challenge them.
What would you say are the unique characteristics of the disinformation scenery in Latvia?
For disinformation to be effective, it always needs to be localised. It has to draw from the local context and make emotional triggers. It needs to be contextual. In Latvia, for example, May 9 is simply a very applicable case. In Russia, it’s celebrated as triumph Day, but in Latvia, it’s regarded as the day of reoccupation. So, by default, it’s a very divisive topic.
The exploitation of this topic—through fearmongering or disinformation claiming that Latvia is falsifying history—is very common. You see akin narratives in Lithuania and Estonia. So while it’s not unique to Latvia alone, it is circumstantial to the region. And it’s a highly emotional, polarizing issue that’s utilized to make discord and divide societies.
When there’s tension between different societal groups, it’s easier to mark them. A unified society is harder to manipulate.
I’ve besides seen how Russian disinformation frequently uses these kinds of localised narratives. 1 of my favourite examples—though it wasn’t aimed specifically at Latvia—was from the Czech Republic. There, a website called The Voice of Europe was discovered.
When I asked people what they associated that name with, they immediately said Voice of America—which was historically known as a origin of truthful information. So Voice of Europe evokes a akin sense of credibility. erstwhile the Czech Republic banned the site and it later moved to Georgia, the disinformation communicative that followed was, „Look, Europe isn’t democratic—it’s behaving like the USSR.”
These are subtle intellectual tactics, exploiting cognitive associations and emotional triggers that people may not consciously notice. So I feel that disinformation isn’t just about spreading fake facts—it’s about constructing a story. It has to fit into a larger communicative in order to be impactful.
That was besides what I wanted to ask you about. So, what is being done to counter disinformation in Latvia, and what more would you recommend?
Latvia’s approach is actually multifaceted. For instance, the national media watchdog has banned the retransmission of Russian and Belarusian tv channels, as well as various websites.
By July last year, 142 tv channels had been banned, along with around 200 domains. Obviously, that reduces vulnerability to direct propaganda. Of course, disinformation is inactive being spread via social media, but even so, you can see there’s a affirmative impact from that.
Then there’s besides the State Chancellery, which is liable for countering disinformation on a governmental level. They’ve developed a centralised framework on how to respond to information threats, including disinformation.
They’ve besides created a platform that allows people to straight study disinformation cases and access various materials, including educational content. They besides produce and print videos online to educate the public.
Last year, Latvia criminalised the usage of deepfakes in election processes, which I think shows that the country is truly keeping up with the times and adapting rapidly to fresh information threats. There are besides various non-governmental entities working on media literacy initiatives, which are a crucial part of building societal resilience to disinformation campaigns.
So I believe it’s a combination of strong organization strategical communication, media literacy initiatives, and support for regional media. Surveys show that people frequently have higher trust in regional media due to the fact that they relate to local issues and better realize their audiences. So I definitely think there should be increased support for regional media as well.
One last question—about the Latvian government and independent organisations’ responses. How effective are they, considering the kind of emotionally charged disinformation you’ve just described?
I hope they’re effective. It’s always hard to measurement the real impact of disinformation campaigns—or the success of countering them. I truly hope we’re reaching people.
Of course, the key is to focus on those who are inactive undecided. If individual is already deep into a conspiracy theory, then simply telling them the fact isn’t likely to work—they’re operating within a completely different communicative that they don’t believe facts can penetrate.
So in order for people to believe truthful narratives, you request to build trust—trust in the media, in institutions, in the state itself. And disinformation campaigns aim to erode that trust. They effort to paint us as untrustworthy, manipulated, or controlled by outside forces.
Yes, we all hope these efforts are effective—and that another countries will look to Latvia as an example. From what you’ve described, it’s clearly a very proactive approach and hopefully an effective one. That brings us to the end of our conversation about the Latvian disinformation landscape.
You can learn more about the disinformation scenery in Latvia here.
