Years of participation in Russian-led forums have left parts of the expert community susceptible to unconsciously amplifying Kremlin narratives amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld of the Clingendael Institute for global Relations told EURACTIV.pl’s fact Talks podcast.
IN BRIEF: Disinformation in the Netherlands
- Dominant narratives: related to the war in Ukraine (justifying the Russian invasion, „pro-peace” narratives), heath, climate, agriculture, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shootdown in 2014
- Main disinformation spreaders: domestic far-right actors (e.g. the PVV organization with its leader Geert Wilders), Russia, countries with large diasporas in the Netherlands (e.g. Turkey, Iran)
- Most common fake news: Ukraine should relinquish territory to accomplish peace, halting military aid would lead to an end to the war, migrants contribute to higher crime rates or place a strain on the welfare system, NATO’s posture incites Russian aggression, the expansion of nitrogen simplification policies being a manifestation of globalism, with the eventual goal of controlling global food output
- Combating disinformation: fostering media literacy, information campaigns, EU legal efforts, launching strategical communication offices within the government, improving access to quality journalism
In this episode, we examine the Dutch disinformation scenery with Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld, elder investigation Fellow at the Clingendael Institute for global Relations in The Hague.
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: The Netherlands is simply a country where information flows freely, but misleading narratives can inactive take root. What are the dominant disinformation narratives circulating in the Netherlands?
Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld: I think I can name 4 dominant narratives. 1 is related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. There are besides many disinformation narratives centered around migration, EU skepticism, and issues related to health, climate, and agriculture.
To start with Russia’s war against Ukraine—these narratives frequently search to justify the invasion. For example, they echo Russian claims. Recently, there has been a spread of statements suggesting that Ukraine should concede territory to end the war or that stopping military support would bring peace. These types of narratives are being circulated.
We identify these as disinformation narratives due to the fact that they are not constant—they highest around circumstantial political developments and then subside. In the regular opinion polls and sociological investigation we conduct at the Institute, we observe that public responses to perceived safety threats vary over time. This fluctuation reflects how these narratives influence perception depending on the broader political context.
When it comes to migration, the narratives frequently play on fears of overpopulation in the Netherlands and advance false claims that migrants increase crime rates or abuse the welfare system. While this is only partially connected to refugees and displaced persons from Ukraine, there’s strong evidence that they have integrated rather well into Dutch society. There is mostly no strong request to debunk these claims 1 by one, due to the fact that Dutch society is rather well-informed.
Regarding EU skepticism, this is simply a more conventional communicative track. It’s sometimes hard to find whether a message qualifies strictly as disinformation or if it’s simply a reflection of existing societal responsibility lines—issues that are already widely discussed and so more susceptible to being weaponised to polarise public opinion. The origins are hard to trace and can only be understood over a longer period.
You mentioned the Russian war on Ukraine and that the disinformation narratives are aimed at justifying the invasion. You besides referred to the pacifist movement—do you see it as an idealistically pacifist movement, or is it besides influenced by pro-Russian disinformation?
There is indeed a pacifist movement in the Netherlands, which utilized to be larger. It dates back to the 1970s and stems partially from criticism of U.S. actions in various parts of the world, specified as the Iraq War—so its roots are tied to very different issues.
However, any disinformation narratives are now targeting this group, seeking to grow its influence. These messages claim that NATO is provoking Russian aggression and that military support only escalates violence. This kind of messaging resonates peculiarly with this group and is being actively spread.
There is this kind of disinformative population replacement explanation that was born in France, but then spread besides in, for example, the United States. Do you see a kind of phenomenon of the migration of populist disinformation narratives around the world?
I would say yes. This besides is, in my view, connected to climate change, and especially in the Western planet and Europe specifically, to the increasing necessity of energy transition and the cost that it brings. But for the European Union specifically, the issue of migration has been very urgent for years due to the ringing of wars and conflicts around Europe, starting from North Africa and now spreading to east Europe.
Yeah, this is surely a trend. But also, what I see—you mentioned the start of this explanation in France—since the beginning of the large-scale invasion in Ukraine, we see that most of the disinformation and narratives are coming from the United Kingdom, France, or Germany.
They are not targeted straight at the Netherlands, with any exceptions, but they do have this second wave of influence. So they’re influencing certain perceptions.
They are accelerating the social divisions already existing in society. And they appeal very much to certain beliefs—ideological beliefs related to capitalism and socialism and different political tendencies. They are peculiarly successful in areas where there is small cognition among society.
How effective is this trust erosion?
When there is simply a cyberattack or sabotage on critical infrastructure, like an electricity blackout, it takes time to find out who is liable for that. As we’ve seen in the Netherlands, there was a large-scale cyberattack on the national police at the beginning of the year.
In specified situations, the population usually would turn to its own national institutions and place blame on them for not protecting things. And that increases the issue of trust in institutions. Then there is simply a increasing polarisation, or the reasoning that policies—such as, for example, NATO.
There is besides a large discussion in the Netherlands related to agriculture and farmers—that the increase of nitrogen simplification policies is being seen as globalist and connected to global control of food production. This kind of communicative tends to put extra force on the government.
But I gotta say, up until now, the Netherlands has been working rather effectively on countering disinformation and besides maintaining a advanced level of trust in its institutions.
And how do you think the emergence of the far-right extremist right is related to disinformation? In the polls, I see that the Freedom organization (PVV), which is now a part of the government, is simply a kind of anti-establishment grouping, while at the same time its leader, Geert Wilders, has been in politics for around 30 years. How do these 2 rises come together? How is disinformation related to the far-right?
Far-right actors usage narratives that can increase their support. These are usually topics that are very controversial in society. You frequently see that they take over or advance the same narratives.
There’s besides a circumstantial and fresh tendency in the last fewer years—on TikTok and social media, the comparatively young population is being targeted. While it’s possible to make certain policies for national communication and established media, it is very hard to influence the information being spread on TikTok and another social media.
So I would say that, in relation to gaining fresh supporters, far-right parties have been successful in reaching young people with these kinds of narratives.
In the Netherlands, you mentioned the PVV organization of Geert Wilders. His main talking points relate to migration in the Netherlands. We saw during coalition formation that he made any compromises on his support to Ukraine. And, of course, there is EU skepticism.
But there is another organization that is very much taking over any of the Russian talking points from Russian state TV. What we besides see is that, due to force on journalism and the rule of showing all sides of the story, sometimes Russian state media is being utilized as a legitimate origin of information. And it’s not being clearly stated that the information comes from there.
Is there any disinformative communicative that is most widespread at the moment. any top, fresh fake news?
Well, if I may usage an example from my individual life: a household associate of mine who is mediocre approached me to say that she thinks what is happening with the war against Ukraine is very bad, but if Ukraine would just give a small bit of its land and resources to Russia, the war would stop.
This implies the communicative that Ukraine is at responsibility for prolonging the war, that it is the 1 not wanting peace. I would say this is 1 specified widespread narrative. Another is about Crimea, the position of Crimea, and the rule of territorial integrity.
So, as far as I hear from you, the subject of Russia’s war against Ukraine is inactive very crucial in the Netherlands, despite the geographical distance?
Yes. Absolutely. Especially in relation to increased defence spending for national security. The Netherlands has been 1 of the leading supporters of Ukraine in both military and financial terms. This is simply a very crucial question—how to address the challenges to Ukraine and to European security. The Netherlands besides values the transatlantic bond with the United States. So this further elevates the relevance of the subject in the Netherlands.
Which actors, which countries, which politicians stand behind the spread of disinformation?
Disinformation in general can come from state actors—foreign state actors. And for the Netherlands, it’s not only countries like Russia. There are others as well, specified as countries with a considerable diaspora in the Netherlands, like Turkey or Iran, influencing certain narratives through their diaspora.
Also in relation to Russia’s war in Ukraine, expert communities are being influenced—their reasoning shaped by a erstwhile past of constructive relations with Russia, specified as participation in Russian safety forums in Moscow. This can lead to unconscious channeling of Russian talking points.
But there are besides experts who possibly do it consciously. Media is very open and values professionalism, aiming to be as nonsubjective as possible. But due to time constraints, certain Russian narratives can get included and later turn out to be manipulated or not objective.
And how does disinformation influence the Dutch people and the Dutch institutions in the longer term?
I would say that inactive the majority of the population is unaware that they are being subjected to disinformation. An example is that last year, during the European Parliament elections, quite a few effort was made by the EU and Dutch government to counter and pre-bunk disinformation narratives. A center was established to check fake news, etc.
But in general, the perception in the Netherlands was that there was no disinformation targeting the EP elections. And in the end, after all the warnings about manipulation and voter interference, no of that appeared to be the case.
This was due to a very successful literacy and information campaign. But this is precisely the challenge—when a run is successful, you cannot prove that there was an incidental that was prevented.
Now I would like to ask you about your definition or description of the specificity—the unique character—of disinformation in the Netherlands. Is there anything that is typical just to your country?
That’s a good question. I would gotta come back to that, I think. But possibly the main trend is—if I compare it to Ukraine, where I work a lot—there is simply a different level of detail. For example, in a certain event, you have different interpretations of what actually happened being spread.
But yes, in the Netherlands, a very circumstantial instance and subject is MH17. That’s the Malaysian Airlines flight that was downed over Ukraine by a Russian missile, and quite a few Dutch citizens were on that flight. After this incident, the Netherlands launched investigations. And during that process, Dutch society was heavy targeted by disinformation narratives around this circumstantial issue.
I think this created more awareness and a realisation of how Russia can act. That besides partially explains the overwhelming support from the Netherlands at the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
So I realize that this kind of disinformation active placing the blame on Ukraine for the crash, yes?
Exactly, yes. Fascinating. Thank you for that. Finally, so that we can end on a affirmative note—what is being done to counter disinformation in the Netherlands, and what more would you recommend?
One of the most basic and widespread measures—ones that don’t require much funding—are media literacy campaigns. These aim at better informing society about issues that might be targeted. It’s a kind of „pre-bunking”—doing it before the disinformation is actually spread.
The European Union has developed a number of policies and fact-checking facilities for journalists and media. On the legislative level, they are continuously expanding the instrumentarium around disinformation. But countries besides request to implement these directives at the national level. The Netherlands has implemented most of them—for example, the Digital Services Act.
There are besides more initiatives being implemented at different levels, specified as setting up strategical communication departments across the government. These aid track narratives and realize which threats—including cybersecurity threats—are emerging.
This is monitored very closely. Especially in relation to MH17, the Netherlands has developed rather an advanced strategy for identifying disinformation narratives and threats coming from abroad state actors.
That sounds optimistic. Still, are there any concrete suggestions you would propose?
Yes, of course, there are many more. Interestingly, any solutions utilized in countries further east in the EU—or in Ukraine—would not be applicable in Western countries.
The crucial difference is that in countries that experienced Russian business or influence, governments find it easier to make public support for certain measures. In countries without that history, it’s much harder to explain to the public. So any form of censoring public information, regulating media, or even establishing strategical communication departments is received much little positively in countries like the Netherlands than in Lithuania, Estonia, or Ukraine.
That’s a difference to take into account. But also, expanding access to high-quality media sources is key. Educating people by making good information more available helps. It allows for more targeted policies, for example regarding social media like TikTok, to better defend the most susceptible segments of the population
You can learn more about the disinformation scenery in the Netherlands here.
