In today’s hyper-connected world, disinformation has become 1 of the Kremlin’s most effective weapons — subtle, pervasive, and tailored to divide. From fabricated exile crises to distorted climate debates, Russia’s narratives are seeping into everyday conversations across Europe, frequently without anyone noticing the source.
In the key election period across Europe and amid ongoing geopolitical tensions, disinformation is one more time taking center stage. From false claims about Ukrainian refugees and migration to misleading narratives around the EU’s climate policy, coordinated manipulation efforts are flooding the digital space — frequently designed to provoke fear, confusion, or polarisation.
Much of this disinformation originates from abroad actors, peculiarly Russia, who exploit delicate social and political issues to sow division within EU societies. The boundaries between authentic public debate and orchestrated influence campaigns are increasingly hard to discern, as false or distorted narratives circulate through social media, messaging apps, and even local community groups.
These trends — including the strategies of Russian propaganda, the function of state-controlled media in countries like Hungary, and the broader vulnerabilities of European societies to manipulation — were discussed by the panelists at the conference Russian Disinformation Against Ukraine hosted by EURACTIV.pl.
Disinformation shapes the Polish presidential race
Disinformation has become a notable feature of the current presidential run in Poland, affecting discussions on a scope of issues, including immigration, the presence of Ukrainian refugees in the country, and the EU’s climate ambitions.
“The subject of migration is omnipresent in the campaign. Of course, we besides inactive see information circulating around climate and climate policies like the European Green Deal as a kind of threat to citizens,” said Aleksandra Wójtowicz, analyst for fresh technologies and digitalization at the Polish Institute of global Affairs (PISM).
As she noted, the narratives are akin to what has already been seen before, but they are intensifying, becoming more severe than during the erstwhile parliamentary elections in 2023.
In addition to these omnipresent narratives, disinformation actors are now reacting in real time to incidents during the run — debates, events, anything that can be manipulated or distorted, the expert added.
Finally, she pointed to direct electoral disinformation — not just misleading narratives about climate or migration, but messages specifically aimed at undermining trust in the electoral process. She cited claims that the election results will be falsified, that the elections are rigged. “We’re besides seeing content designed to discourage people from voting,” Wójtowicz said.
“This has already started, and we anticipate even more of it as we approach election day. Interestingly, Russian actors have been attributed to any of these efforts. For example, the Doppelganger run — a coordinated disinformation operation run by Russia — is now actively targeting Poland in this election cycle.”
How to recognise disinformation? It’s all about intent
When asked how to identify disinformation and separate it from another types of misleading content online, Aleksandra Wójtowicz explained that the key difference is its coordination and intentionality.
“Disinformation is designed to mislead. Most of what we see online, though, we’d classify as misinformation — that’s erstwhile individuals consume disinformation, believe it, and then share it — not to mislead, but due to the fact that they genuinely think it’s actual and helpful to others,” she explained.
Disinformation attribution is hard — and actors work hard to make attribution even harder — but it is possible, the expert believes.
“Take migration narratives, for example. any of them were traced back to campaigns like Doppelganger or Overload. With social media analysis, you can examine circumstantial accounts, detect bot networks, and review account histories to uncover coordinated efforts,” she said.
She noted that there are accounts that previously posted in Russian before shifting to Polish disinformation — “a clear sign of coordination.” There are techniques and analytical tools that let us to identify disinformation actors behind certain themes.
“The problem, however, is what happens erstwhile these narratives go mainstream. Over time, they become widespread. So now, it’s not just disinformation actors saying ‘migrants are dangerous’ or ‘migrants are raping Polish women’ — it’s average people too,” Wójtowicz said.
In her view, it is due to the fact that 2 or 3 years ago, negative sentiment towards migrants in Poland was much lower than it is today. “The shift came due to the strength of disinformation campaigns — and due to the fact that many politicians embraced those narratives,” she explained.
From parenting forums to Kremlin talking points
“Everyone is entitled to their opinion. That’s a core rule in the EU. The tricky part is identifying the origin of a circumstantial narrative. And in countries like Poland, extra effort is frequently made to hide that source, so you request circumstantial skills and tools to find whether a communicative comes from a pro-Kremlin ecosystem,” Martyna Bildziukiewicz, Deputy Head of Division in the European External Action Service (EEAS), agreed.
“For example, if the origin is Sputnik, most people now admit it as Russian disinformation and propaganda. But what if you see the same message by an individual — almost verbatim — on a parenting forum? That’s much harder to assess,” she said.
Even if it sounds like disinformation, you can’t definitively call it that unless you can verify the source. It might be a sincere opinion, and in that case, there’s nothing we can do, due to the fact that people have the right to express themselves, she argued.
“But that’s precisely what threat actors like Russia are exploiting. They inject narratives into unexpected corners of the information environment — hoping that individual will choice them up. And sometimes, those narratives are picked up by mainstream media, or even by politicians.”
Hungary: A case survey in institutionalised disinformation
“Hungary serves, to a certain extent, as a laboratory of post-truth and disinformation tactics — a sad reminder that in environments where the government and mainstream politics are highly supportive of Russian disinformation narratives, the impact on public opinion can be even greater,” said Péter Krekó, Executive manager at Political Capital.
He said that while, according to the polls, at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the majority of voters from the pro-government Fidesz organization were inactive blaming Russia, ahead of the 2022 elections in April, the government launched an intense run blaming the war practically on Ukraine, Brussels, and the West.
“This run had a crucial effect. Within just a fewer months, we saw a shift in public opinion among Fidesz voters. A majority began to blame the United States first, Ukraine second — and Russia only third. So, in little than 3 months, the communicative changed entirely in the pro-governmental camp,” he noted.
Krekó characterised Hungary as an informational autocracy, where conspiracy theories and disinformation primarily originate from official, semi-official, or government-controlled sources.
He named 2 disinformation campaigns moving in parallel. 1 is related to the alleged consultative referendum launched by the government to argue Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
“It exaggerates the financial, demographic, and safety risks of specified a move. And it’s bizarre, considering Viktor Orbán’s government has been in power for 15 years — yet they’re utilizing this referendum as a way to show Brussels that ‘the people’ are against Ukraine’s EU accession,” Kreko said.
The second ongoing issue is simply a increasing intelligence and counter-intelligence conflict between Ukraine and Hungary.
He cited Ukrainian authorities having released reports suggesting that 2 Ukrainian individuals working for Hungarian secret services were exploring scenarios for a Hungarian attack against Ukraine. “We can’t verify how credible these claims are, but they’ve triggered a severe bilateral crisis,” he noted.
Russian propaganda’s deep roots and global reach
“Russian disinformation in Ukraine is not just about mass media or social communication. It’s an industrial-level operation aimed at shaping the minds of millions of people — not just in Ukraine, but besides across the EU and in Russia itself,” said Yevhen Mahda, Executive manager of the Institute of planet Policy.
He said Russian disinformation in Ukraine is profoundly rooted in russian ideological traditions, but has evolved to exploit modern information technologies.
“It blends the glorification of the USSR and figures like Stalin—the alleged ‘Father of Nations’—with contemporary imagery of president Putin disseminated through platforms like Instagram, TikTok, and especially anonymous Telegram channels,” he explained.
One powerful example of Russian disinformation is the infamous fake communicative of the „crucified boy”, which emerged in 2014. “Although fabricated, it had an tremendous mobilizing impact,” Mahda said.
As a core subject of Russian propaganda, he named the denial of Ukrainian statehood. The underlying message is that Ukraine as a sovereign nation simply cannot or should not exist.
After the full-scale invasion in 2022, the dominant communicative was that Russia was not fighting Ukraine, but NATO. However, with Donald Trump’s return to the political scene, a shift occurred. The blame moved to Europe, painting it as an obstacle to peace and framing European governments as “Eurofascists”.
Russian propaganda besides attempts to sow division within Ukraine by fabricating or amplifying interior conflicts — specified as the expected rivalry between president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and erstwhile military chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the expert noted.
He added that Russian narratives frequently invoke emotionally charged WWII and Cold War-era terms, like “Nazis” or “Banderovtsi”, to manipulate older audiences shaped by russian education.
Building resilience: Tools, sanctions, and strategical communication
Everyone is susceptible to disinformation, Martyna Bildziukiewicz said. According to her, 1 of the means of defence is to realize our own vulnerabilities and stay aware of them.
Still, she pointed out that uncovering credible information present is harder than it utilized to be. “We now gotta actively look for it… We request to cultivate an attitude of critical engagement.”
She emphasised the increasing function of the EU’s FIMI toolbox (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference), and tools specified as OSINT, fact-checking platforms, and sanctions targeting Russian outlets.
“So, are we doing enough? most likely not yet. But we do now have the essential tools, and we’re working regular to make our information environment more secure,” she summed up.
Aleksandra Wójtowicz pointed to wellness being a key area where disinformation strikes hardest. She cited parenting groups on Facebook, which morphed into hubs for vaccine misinformation and anti-science content.
“It is not that people went there to be radicalised—but erstwhile you’re a fresh parent, uncertain, and looking for guidance… disinformation can find a foothold,” she explained.
She besides highlighted the importance of the Digital Services Act (DSA), noting Poland’s hold in implementation as a crucial vulnerability. Without a Digital Services Coordinator, Poland’s ability to counter disinformation in real time is hampered.
Truth needs better marketing
At the same time, Wójtowicz stressed, government alone isn’t enough. We request compelling storytelling to compete with emotionally charged disinformation.
“Right now, the pro-democratic, fact-based content we produce frequently just isn’t as engaging… We request to halt reasoning of ‘fact-checking’ as something dry or reactive.”
Especially on platforms like TikTok and Instagram, we request to equip creators with credible content and let them form the message. “It’s not about pushing authoritative lines — it’s about showing that fact can besides be compelling.”
“Too often, people — including any policymakers — dismiss disinformation as ‘just talk,’ something that can be fixed with better messaging. But the stakes are far higher than that,” Péter Krekó warned.
He pointed to Hungary’s active obstruction of Ukraine’s EU accession, and Slovakia’s increasing alignment with Budapest under Robert Fico.
He besides referenced a Hungarian Digital Media Observatory survey showing that 62% of Hungarians believe Ukrainians committed genocide — a testament to the scope and success of disinformation campaigns.
Krekó stressed all EU countries are susceptible to disinformation, including Poland and the Baltic States.
“Yet even in hard environments, fact-based communication works. Our partner Lakmusz in Hungary has reached over 2 million unique users—more than a 4th of the population—with fact-checks. So no, fact-checking doesn’t should be boring or ineffective. It can be creative and impactful,” the panelist said.
Russia’s war of words
The evidence pointing to Russia’s function in disinformation campaigns is clear, Yevhen Mahda said: the infrastructure—including Telegram channels, communicative frameworks, and distribution methods—closely mirrors Russian interests and long-established patterns.
“Sometimes it’s a form of mimicry,” he added, “with Russian propaganda disguised as Ukrainian-language content to manipulate users more effectively.”
Following the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s interior demographics shifted dramatically—millions relocated within the country or sought refuge abroad. Yewhen noted that refugees from cities like Kharkiv or Dnipro, now surviving in the EU, may unintentionally spread Russian disinformation encountered through Russian-language platforms.
He stressed that 1 cannot prepare for war without knowing how Russian propaganda operates. “As a civilian, I see propaganda as Russia’s primary weapon—not tanks or missiles, but narratives,” he said.
“This war isn’t just about land. It’s a conflict for our minds, our independence, and our very sense of sovereignty.”
Video recording from the conference is available below.
