In Estonia, Russia is frequently depicted as a stronghold of patriarchal order, standing in stark contrast to the “morally degenerate” West, allegedly doomed to collapse under the weight of liberal values, equality, and solidarity, Maria Murumaa-Mengel of University of Tartu told EURACTIV.pl’s fact Talks podcast.
IN BRIEF: Disinformation in Estonia
- Dominant narratives: “failed state” narrative, narratives based on russian nostalgia, anti-NATO, anti-EU, Westernophobic, esoteric self-healing trends, “us vs. them” narratives
Main disinformation spreaders: Russia, the US, people seeking profits (e.g. organisers of webinars, sellers of “magic” items), home pro-Russian or nationalist parties tied to global right-wing networks or financed by Hungary - Most common false stories:
- Estonia as a not entirely separate state in terms of culture,
- today’s youth portrayed as “snowflakes”
- in the past, society didn’t have “confusing things” specified as LGBTQ+ identities or disabilities,
- the West symbolising moral decay, eroding the patriarchy and conventional household structures, Russia portrayed as a bastion of patriarchy, while the „morally corrupt” West is doomed by its liberal values,
- Ukrainians disregarding local culture and showing disrespect for crucial monuments,
- Ukrainians portrayed as uncivilised or even barbaric,
- masculine leaders (e.g. Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin) portrayed as defenders of conventional values worldwide
- Combating disinformation: Ridiculing false narratives and trends (e.g. the People Who Think AI-Generated Photos Are Real group on Facebook), enhancing media and digital literacy (cooperation with teachers, parents, community leaders), global collaborations (EDMO, BEDSID project), pre-bunking, high-quality journalism, push for better regulations, providing investigation and expertise
Today, we delve into Estonian disinformation scenery with Dr Maria Murumaa-Mengel, Associate prof. of Media Studies at the Institute of Social Studies, University of Tartu.
Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: As a digitally advanced nation on the EU’s border with Russia, Estonia has been a frequent mark of disinformation campaigns, peculiarly from abroad actors—but possibly not only. What are the dominant disinformation narratives circulating in Estonia today?
Maria Murumaa-Mengel: There are many, and not all of them are disinformation. quite a few information disorder comes from misinformation—people simply not knowing the full picture, being scared, being angry, and sharing things they haven’t fact-checked. Just human things.
What we know from working with researchers and practitioners from different fields, and from analysing disinformation narratives, is that existing divides and social problems make a very fertile ground for chaos, panic, and distrust toward institutions. It’s the same in Estonia. Whatever people are already debating heatedly is being used.
Most European countries have faced akin issues—migration, the legalisation of same-sex marriage, the pandemic, rising prices, sustainability, and climate change. Whatever people are arguing about is systematically and strategically exploited.
In Estonia, we see any narratives that aren’t entirely unique but are akin to those spread about Ukraine—particularly the “failed state” narrative. This attempts to depict Estonia as a country that isn’t truly a country, despite its long past and distinct linguistic identity.
Similar claims were made about Ukraine, frequently accompanied by russian nostalgia. On social media, we see many thematic forums and groups that are almost retro-utopian, reminiscing about the “good old russian times”—remembering them as brighter than they actually were.
Older generations are especially susceptible to these soft-power, long-game manipulation tactics. The planet is always changing, and people tend to look back on their childhood and youth as the best time.
Narratives appear about how “we didn’t have phones, we could run outside, be strong and independent”, while today’s youth are portrayed as “snowflakes”. This extends to more problematic ideas, like the belief that in the past, society didn’t have “confusing things” specified as LGBTQ+ identities or disabilities—deeply flawed memories that weren’t actual but are powerfully amplified in these groups.
And, of course, there’s the acquainted communicative of the “big bad” NATO, the West, and the EU—portrayed as forces of moral decay, eroding the patriarchy and conventional household structures.
Recently, we’ve been working on gendered disinformation and noticing how hyper-masculinity plays a central function in these narratives. They frequently frame Russia as a place where patriarchal order inactive exists, portraying it as a good thing, while the “morally corrupt” West is doomed due to its commitment to liberal values, equality, and solidarity.
In general, these narratives stay consistent due to the fact that they are so effective. They trust on an “us vs. them” mentality, demonisation, and basic intellectual mechanisms that form how our brains process information. That’s why we see akin narratives not only in Estonia but besides in Ukraine, the US, and elsewhere.
Do you think this is primarily disinformation and misinformation, as you mentioned? Or is it frequently just an opinion—an explanation that originates in fringe circles and then gradually gains mainstream traction?
Of course, it’s a good thing that people debate and think critically about the planet and its changes. We don’t want a two-party or one-party strategy where everyone has to think the same way—that wouldn’t be healthy for democracy.
But we do become afraid erstwhile we see the same repeated elements appearing in grassroots posts. For example, in 2022, erstwhile Ukrainian refugees arrived in Estonia, a circumstantial communicative started circulating—not just in Estonia, but across the Baltics. It appeared in tiny towns and villages in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, where Ukrainians had settled and integrated into local communities.
The communicative claimed that these “bad Ukrainians” didn’t care about local culture and were disrespecting crucial monuments—sometimes even urinating on them. The details varied—different places, different monuments—but the core communicative remained the same.
This was a deliberate disinformation run originating from Russia, designed to foster disgust and represent Ukrainians as uncivilised, even barbaric. Stories like these are powerful manipulation techniques, so we keep a close watch on specified patterns.
You mentioned Russia, and that’s precisely the direction I wanted to research further. You’ve pointed out that disinformation and misinformation narratives are utilized strategically and systematically. Who are the actors behind them? Who is actively creating and spreading disinformation in Estonia?
I think there are respective types of actors. Many people spread misinformation simply due to the fact that they’re human—we all make mistakes, get tricked, or share things without thinking.
But erstwhile it comes to deliberate manipulation of the public, that’s a different story. Since I investigation this field, my position might disagree from individual else’s, who might categorise things differently.
The first category I’d item are those who exploit information disorder for profit—taking advantage of fear and the general anxiety caused by the polycrisis we’re experiencing.
Some actors in the disinformation scenery are simply looking to profit—selling webinars, life coaching, “miracle” solutions, or esoteric protective devices.
But what we see in Estonia is simply a chaotic mix of different narratives. Esoteric self-healing trends—crystals, pseudo-beliefs, alternate spiritual systems—are closely linked to conspiracy theories. These narratives frequently originate in Russia or migrate from the United States, spreading through global conspiracy networks.
Certain individuals exploit this situation, presenting themselves as having “the solution”—for a price. “Give me your money, and I’ll make everything better.” This sector worries me profoundly due to the fact that it represents the worst of human behaviour.
Of course, any genuinely believe in what they preach—protective energy bubbles, speaking to angels. That falls under misinformation, as they aren’t deliberately deceiving people. But those who cynically exploit these beliefs as a money-making opportunity? I have no respect for them. They are a significant, amorphous part of our information disorder.
Then, there are politically motivated actors. In Estonia, we’ve seen the emergence of tiny pro-Russian parties. any openly talk about rejoining Russia, though that’s not their main messaging.
Many Russian-speaking Estonians are loyal to Estonia and don’t support reintegration with Russia, so the rhetoric is frequently softened: “Let’s be good neighbours,” “Let’s not provoke Russia,” or “We support peaceful relations.”
On the another side, we have nationalist populist parties that are not pro-Russian but usage strong national symbols—flags, national emblems, patriotic imagery—to appeal to voters. These groups frequently have connections to global right-wing networks.
Investigative journalism has revealed that any Estonian parties receive backing from Hungarian right-wing and spiritual organisations. This isn’t just about making money—it’s about advancing political ambitions.
It sounds like a kind of global disinformation.
Exactly. And everything is international. Many conspiracy theories and alleged “heroic saviours” are not local figures. The same strong, masculine leaders—Trump, Putin, and others—are portrayed as defenders of conventional values worldwide.
And, of course, we can’t ignore Russia’s massive disinformation operations. It would be naïve to think otherwise. Russia strategically deploys information manipulation tactics in all neighbouring country—and beyond. They employment individuals whose sole occupation is to comment online all day, utilizing multiple accounts.
Their messages don’t even should be explicitly pro-Russian. Often, the goal is simply to erode trust, make chaos, and flood the information space with mixed signals. Unfortunately, I think we’ve underestimated the scale of these actors—akin to China’s “50 Cent Army” or another known disinformation networks.
This is simply a subject I’m peculiarly passionate about. In the past, we advised people to retreat from toxic information spaces for the sake of their intellectual health—to go on “media diets” and avoid disturbing news. But we no longer say that.
Now, we emphasise that staying informed and speaking out is simply a civic duty. Even if you fear online trolls or being dragged into the mud, it’s crucial to engage. Otherwise, the loudest voices will belong to those who are paid to spread misinformation or are profoundly entrenched in it. Their content gets seen, shared, and archived.
That’s why experts in various fields must be present in online discussions. My expertise is media, so I effort to supply credible sources and advance technological literacy. Doctors should counter medical misinformation. Military experts should address defense-related disinformation.
We request real experts to be visible. due to the fact that erstwhile we engage in these debates, we’re not truly arguing with the trolls. I don’t even care what, if they change their head or whatever. I care about the invisible masses who never leave a mark of their presence, due to the fact that most social media users are lurkers.
Many people turn to social media just to observe—checking the conversation, getting a sense of public sentiment, and forming their opinions. They don’t actively engage or leave a trace, but they do request correct, factual, evidence-based information.
If that information isn’t available, and all they see are trolls arguing and spreading nonsense, their knowing of critical issues—like vaccines or global energy ties—will be fundamentally flawed.
In Poland, we late saw a wave of AI-generated images portraying idyllic agrarian scenes, like a farmer who supposedly built a peculiar barn but never got recognition. These posts would receive thousands of comments saying, “That’s beautiful,” or “We’d love to support you.” Do you see akin trends in Estonia?
Oh God, so much. 1 way to counter it is through humour and ridicule. I know that’s a slippery slope, but social sanctioning works on different levels. Making fun of these deceptive narratives can be an effective way to push back.
We do that, but humour tends to stay within certain bubbles.
True. But there’s a large Facebook group called People Who Think AI-Generated Photos Are Real, with around 200,000 members. If any of our listeners are on Facebook, I highly urge joining—it’s full of both absurd examples and more serious discussions on detecting AI-generated content.
Many of those comments—“That’s so beautiful,” “Great job,” “I’d love to buy one”—are likely from bots. There are so many fake accounts generating artificial engagement.
I besides think older generations are more susceptible to this. We work a lot with young people, and while not all of them, the media-savvy ones tend to be almost paranoid about digital content—constantly questioning, “Wait, is this real? What’s the source? Can I trust this?” Of course, that kind of hyper-vigilance comes with its own challenges.
There are persistent narratives designed to make people want to believe something. Feel-good viral stories are a large example. But erstwhile it comes to harmful misinformation, it’s not usually about a single incorrect fact. It’s more insidious—opinion pieces, subtle messaging, slow narrative-building.
A kind of disinfo vibe.
Exactly. It’s about creating a backdrop—shaping what people see as normal, what’s acceptable, how the planet order should function, and who is entitled to what. Disinformation frequently spreads through hints, memes, and jokes—subtle, seemingly lighthearted content that gradually influences people.
What is being done to fight disinformation in Estonia, and what more would you recommend?
I’m a media professional by training, with a background in journalism and communication. Universities played a crucial role, especially during the pandemic. Our alumni and professional networks reached out, saying, We request to do something. That’s how we became a hub for both formal and informal initiatives.
At the University of Tartu, we’ve been active on multiple fronts. We see media and digital literacy as essential—arguably more crucial than any conventional school subjects. We work with teachers, youth workers, librarians, parents, and community leaders, spreading the message: Here’s how you verify information. Here’s how you question people’s agendas.
We’ve developed educational materials for all age groups, starting from kindergarten, due to the fact that even young children are independent media users and can be susceptible to misinformation or even radicalization. Our approach is playful, ensuring that media literacy education reflects real digital habits. alternatively of lecturing kids about tv news—something they seldom watch—we talk about influencers, the attention economy, and the mechanics of online influence.
We’re besides active in global collaborations, peculiarly through the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) network. 1 key task is BEDSID—the Baltic Engagement Center for Combating Information Disorders, which helps us compare misinformation trends across different countries. Recognising both similarities and differences is crucial—for example, any narratives spread universally, while others are more localised.
A major part of our strategy is pre-bunking—inoculating people against misinformation before they encounter it. These disinformation threats aren’t going away; they’re an inherent part of the information ecosystem.
We besides support professional journalism nevertheless we can—providing expertise, fact-checking, and amplifying quality reporting. Without independent, democratic journalism, democracy itself is at risk. We’ve seen this happen. That’s why we work to guarantee journalists have access to resources, training, and multilingual content.
At the University of Tartu, we’ve launched a one-year master’s program in English, focused on building societal resilience to information disorders. The first group has just completed the program, and it’s been eye-opening. Countries as different as Estonia and Armenia face identical disinformation tactics aimed at sowing distrust in society. Sharing cognition and best practices across borders is essential.
Beyond education, we besides push for better regulations—advocating for stronger legal frameworks to counter disinformation. But Estonia, with just 1.3 million people, is simply a tiny market. Companies like Meta don’t prioritise moderating disinformation in tiny languages and cultures. That’s a major challenge.
That’s why we request to stand alongside others and lobby for better regulations on major online platforms—to put an end to this broligarchy that’s taking hold.
We’re contributing with the best investigation and cognition available, ensuring that our advocacy is backed by solid evidence. And as I mentioned earlier—whoever is willing to listen, we urge them to take action.
Don’t just quit and bury yourself before you’re actually dead. Do something. Even if it’s small—just a minute of your day—make an effort. Leave a mark. Improve things, even in the tiniest way. We can’t let this be the end of us.
You can learn more about the disinformation scenery in Estonia here.
TruthTalks is simply a brave fresh podcast series tackling the challenges resulting from fake news and propaganda head-on. Join us for engaging short conversations with experts from all EU associate states and Ukraine as we uncover the fact behind dominant disinformation trends and research the strategies shaping Europe’s fight against manipulation.
