Manipulation is the defining characteristic of propaganda / fact Talks: Lithuania

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„Propaganda is not always based on outright lies. Those who spread it may supply a false context, omit certain facts, or present only a partial truth,” Viktor Denisenko of Vilnius University told EURACTIV.pl’s fact Talks podcast.

Disinformation in Lithuania in brief

  • Dominant narratives: anti-LGBT, “anti-fascist”, related to the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states, war in Ukraine, energy security, the migration crisis at the borders of Belarus, Taiwan
  • Main disinformation spreaders: Russia, including both foreign-oriented Kremlin media (Sputnik, RT) and Baltic pro-Moscow (e.g. Baltnews), Belarus, China, any home politicians
  • Most common fake news: violation of Russian-speaking population’s rights in the Baltics, Lithuania’s hostility towards Russia and Russians, Lithuania’s support for war in general, Ukraine, not Russia, as the aggressor in the conflict, Lithuania as a puppet of the EU, NATO, and the US, global organisations under Washington’s control, energy instability and rising prices due to the Baltics disconnecting from the Russian electricity network, Lithuania’s economical collapse
  • Combating disinformation: limiting the scope of or blocking certain Russian-language media (e.g., Sputnik), restricting Kremlin-affiliated content, and enhancing media literacy, including its integration into school curricula.

Welcome to TruthTalks, a brave fresh podcast series tackling the challenges resulting from fake news and propaganda head-on. Join us for engaging short conversations with experts from all EU associate states and Ukraine as we uncover the fact behind dominant disinformation trends and research the strategies shaping Europe’s fight against manipulation.

In this episode, we research Lithuania’s disinformation scenery with Viktor Denisenko, Head of the Centre for Communication Influences and Propaganda investigation at Vilnius University’s Faculty of Communication.

Karolina Zbytniewska, EURACTIV.pl: Lithuania has long been a mark of Russian disinformation campaigns, even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What are the key narratives being pushed today, and how have they evolved in consequence to fresh geopolitical events?

Viktor Denisenko: So it’s actual that Lithuania, a long time ago, was identified by Russia as 1 of the targets for disinformation and propaganda activities. I could say that in this case, our historical relations with Russia are rather crucial due to the fact that it is first of all a past of russian business in the 20th century. From the beginning, our relations were not very good.

If we’re talking about propaganda and disinformation, I could say that the first elements of the alleged information war between Lithuania and Russia—or, better to say, between the Baltic states, keeping in head that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have rather akin histories—can be traced back 3 decades.

From the beginning, there were quite a few different narratives, peculiarly about Russian-speaking minorities in Lithuania, but besides in the Baltic states in general. These narratives frequently focused on alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities, among another issues. Of course, erstwhile discussing this challenge today, we should keep in head the geopolitical situation and Russia’s war against Ukraine. Today, we see a variety of different narratives.

One of the most prominent narratives Russia is trying to usage against Lithuania is related to its support for Ukraine. Lithuania is portrayed as a highly hostile state that does everything against Russia. In Russian disinformation, Lithuania’s support for Ukraine is framed as a hostile act, with the claim that Lithuania, in general, supports war. In this Russian narrative, it is not Russia waging war, but alternatively Ukraine fighting against Russia.

Another key communicative suggests that Lithuania is not an independent state but simply a puppet of the European Union, NATO, or, most of all, the United States. This is besides a conventional narrative. From the Russian perspective, the United States is seen as the main hostile actor, while another states or global organisations are frequently depicted as specified puppets of Washington in criminal propaganda.

Additionally, Russian propaganda reacts to agenda-setting and current events. For example, 1 of the most prominent narratives today, peculiarly against Lithuania and the Baltic states, concerns energy security. A fewer days ago, the Baltic states moved to disconnect from the alleged BRELL energy network, and this has become a focal point for Russian disinformation.

It was an electricity connection with Russia and Belarus, but we changed our connection to the European market, to the European Union. We have been working on this task for the past 10 years. So finally, we did it. But of course, Russia portrays this as a origin of energy instability.

There are many narratives claiming that electricity prices will rise, and that this is solely due to the fact that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia made this decision. There are quite a few narratives, and if I were to present a full list, it would be a very, very long discussion.

How do you know it’s Russian disinformation? Do you trace any proof of that?

Of course, that’s a very good question. I besides emphasise that today, it’s not adequate to simply say, “I don’t like this narrative, so it’s disinformation.” That would itself be a form of manipulation in Lithuania.

First of all, we effort to verify narratives. In Lithuania today, we have a rather strong community of fact-checking journalists who work on this issue and effort to find which elements of these narratives are false.

Also, in general, there are well-known sources of Kremlin propaganda. It is rather easy to identify certain media outlets or websites that pretend to be legitimate mass media, specified as Sputnik, Russia present (RT), or even circumstantial media created by Russia for the Baltic states, like Baltnews.

We can say that we are dealing with well-known sources of propaganda and disinformation. However, we cannot simply presume that just due to the fact that something comes from Baltnews, it is automatically propaganda. rather often, different kinds of information are mixed within these media outlets.

The main criterion erstwhile identifying disinformation or propaganda—especially disinformation—is the question of facts. Are we dealing with facts, or is there false information? We must besides keep in head that propaganda is not always based on outright lies.

The main feature of propaganda is manipulation. Those who spread propaganda or disinformation may supply a false context, omit certain facts, or present only a partial truth. This, too, can be a tool of propaganda and disinformation. So, all time we discuss certain narratives, it is crucial to prove that we are dealing with something that is not entirely connected to reality.

You mentioned Russia, but are there any another actors active in creating or spreading disinformation in Lithuania?

I would say that Russia is the main actor, and even the most visible one. But of course, there are more players. It is besides possible to talk about propaganda from Belarus, which is rather common in Lithuania.

However, we sometimes make the mistake of conflating Belarusian propaganda with Russian propaganda, assuming that since Belarus is not truly independent and geopolitically remains in Moscow’s pocket, we should not pay peculiar attention to its narratives. Belarusian propaganda is indeed akin to Russian propaganda, but I do not full agree with the view that they are the same.

Some investigation suggests that Belarusian propaganda can disagree in certain aspects. 1 of its key narratives focuses on the border. The ongoing crisis at the borders between Belarus and Lithuania, Belarus and Poland, and Belarus and Latvia—in general, the border between Belarus and the European Union—remains a central subject of Belarusian propaganda.

We inactive have an artificially created migration crisis, orchestrated by the Lukashenko regime. Belarusian propaganda continues to push circumstantial narratives about this border issue.

Additionally, while little visible, we occasionally see propaganda narratives coming from China. This is peculiarly applicable to Lithuania, given the geopolitical tensions between the 2 countries. Lithuania has a conflict with China due to its support for democracy in Taiwan, and we have a typical office of Taiwan in Vilnius—named “Taiwan,” not “Taipei.”

From time to time, China reminds the planet that Lithuania is not on good terms with it. However, an interesting point is that China frequently repeats certain Kremlin propaganda narratives. This suggests a level of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in the field of propaganda and disinformation.

You mentioned Russia first, then there’s a long gap with no another major players, followed by Belarus and China. I would besides like to ask about the function of interior actors in the disinformation space—such as Lithuanian politicians, influencers, and so on. Is this a applicable issue?

Yes, it is simply a factor, but rather a insignificant 1 in Lithuania, especially erstwhile compared to another countries. We do have any politicians who repeat narratives that can be linked to Kremlin propaganda.

However, there is always the question of whether a individual is repeating these narratives due to the fact that they are under the influence of the Kremlin or simply due to the fact that they genuinely believe in them—for example, believing that vaccines are harmful. It is frequently hard to separate between external influence and individual convictions.

That said, Lithuania has a alternatively unique situation. In general, within the political and public spheres—including among influencers—there is simply a strong and dominant consensus on key issues. For example, there is broad agreement on supporting Ukraine and recognizing Russia as the aggressor, with Ukraine fighting to defend its independence.

Additionally, Lithuania has long been aware of Kremlin propaganda efforts. The country has been focused on information warfare for a long time—well before the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and even before Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008. So, erstwhile we talk about public discourse and the presence of certain narratives, there is simply a strong consensus on the key points.

Is this disinformation effort targeting circumstantial groups, specified as the Russian-speaking minority, or is it aimed at Lithuanian society as a whole?

The scope of topics utilized by Kremlin propaganda is very broad, meaning different narratives are designed to influence different groups within Lithuanian society. The Russian-speaking population is 1 specified group. In Lithuania, we frequently say that national minorities are more susceptible to Kremlin propaganda, primarily due to the language factor. any information is more easy accessible to them in Russian, making it more likely to scope their attention.

However, Russia besides seeks to influence another groups within Lithuanian society. any Kremlin narratives can appeal to various segments of the population. For example, extremist political groups—whether far-right or far-left—are frequently drawn to circumstantial Kremlin messages. Russia promotes narratives that may resonate with them, specified as anti-LGBT rhetoric or alleged anti-fascist struggles.

It is besides clear that Kremlin propaganda exploits real societal issues. This includes problems related to social welfare and economical vulnerability. People in financially precarious situations are peculiarly susceptible to these narratives. Propagandists find it easier to manipulate real problems, amplifying them and presenting them as existential crises.

Every country has economical difficulties, but Kremlin propaganda does not discuss them as average challenges—it portrays them as catastrophic failures for Lithuania or another targeted nations.

You mentioned China’s interest in spreading disinformation in the country. Are there any another distinctive features of Lithuania’s disinformation landscape?

It’s hard to pinpoint unique characteristics due to the fact that we live in the age of global information. Even erstwhile discussing narratives directed against Lithuania, they are frequently not exclusively about Lithuania but alternatively part of a broader disinformation campaign.

In many cases, Kremlin propaganda targets the full Baltic region—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—as a single unit. It’s not just about Lithuania but about undermining the Baltic states collectively. Additionally, many of these narratives focus on NATO, and since Lithuania is simply a NATO member, it becomes a natural target. The same applies to broader disinformation efforts against the West—Lithuania and the another Baltic states are part of the Western world, so the attacks frequently fit into a larger anti-Western framework.

If I had to item a more circumstantial narrative, I would mention Lithuania’s strong push for energy independence, peculiarly the decision to synchronise its electricity grid with the remainder of Europe. This has been a subject of targeted disinformation. However, even this fits into a wider Kremlin communicative against the West, NATO, and the European Union. So, it’s challenging to identify uniquely „Lithuanian” disinformation themes that don’t besides apply elsewhere.

What measures are being taken in Lithuania to counter disinformation, and what more would you recommend?

This is simply a large and complex issue. In my view, Lithuania’s top advantage is that we admit the challenge. That in itself is significant. erstwhile I talk with colleagues from another countries, specified as Slovakia or Hungary, they frequently express frustration that their authorities do not admit the problem. In Lithuania, we don’t have that issue—our authorities admit that action is needed.

Several steps have already been taken. any Russian media channels were removed from Lithuanian cable networks to limit their reach. There have besides been attempts to restrict the spread of Kremlin-affiliated content online, specified as blocking the Sputnik network. However, in the digital age, it’s not easy to completely prevent the spread of disinformation.

The most effective long-term solution, in my opinion, is media literacy. The key is to educate society so that people can admit disinformation and, crucially, refrain from spreading it on social media. In Lithuania, media literacy efforts are led primarily by non-governmental organizations. There has been a long-standing thought to integrate media literacy into school curricula, but this is challenging—it requires trained teachers and broader education reform.

Despite the difficulties, I hope concrete advancement will be made in this area soon. Ultimately, the best defence against disinformation is an informed society. It may not be a unique solution, but it is the most effective one.

You can learn more about the disinformation scenery in Lithuania here.

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